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Introduction
According to the March 5, 1997 issue of the Wall Street Journal, Texas passed New York 
to claim the number two ranking in high-tech jobs.1 The newspaper cited statistics, recently 
published by the American Electronic Association, that show 313,460 Texans employed in high- 
tech jobs in 1995, trailing only California’s 669,349. The high-tech work force in Texas increased 
by 39,000 jobs from 1990 to 1995, the biggest leap in the nation. The state, however, remains 
third behind New York and California in the number of high-tech businesses and total payroll.
Twenty years ago, the Texas energy sector made headlines in major newspapers. Today, 
high technology (both manufacturing and services) rivals the energy sector as the engine of 
growth of the state (Petersen and Thomas 1995). Employment data show that while the energy 
sector employed 260,000 people in Texas in 1980 (accounting for 4.3 percent of total 
nonagricultural employment in the state), only 156,000 worked in that sector in 1996 (accounting 
for 1.8 percent of total nonagricultural employment in the state). The oil and gas extraction 
industry accounts for a larger share of state output than of total state employment. Duca (1997), 
an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, points out that high tech2 accounts for 20 
percent of the state’s economic output, while energy accounts for around 10 percent.
With this change in the economy has come a change in emphasis in economic and business 
discussions. The economic and business issues of the 1980s concerned the price of oil and the 
exploration of new oil reserves, but the relevant issues of the 1990s focus on the competitiveness 
of high-technology firms, which, in many sectors, is defined by competition with Japanese firms 
(see Tyson 1993). The National Science Foundation (1996) reports that between 1983 and 1993 
(the latest year for which this information is available), the number of U.S. patents granted to 
Japanese residents increased dramatically, with Japanese investors receiving 23 percent of all
1 High tech is defined as computer and office equipment, consumer electronics, communications equipment, 
electronic components and accessories, semiconductors, and industrial electronics.
2 He uses a definition of high technology that includes sectors that have a higher percentage of technicians, 
engineers, and scientists than most manufacturers and that have an above-average research and development 
component.
1
U.S. patents in 1993 and 49 percent of all U.S. patents with foreign origin. Only ten years 
earlier, these shares were 16 and 37 percent, respectively. In nearly all of the six commercially 
important industries—computer hardware, industrial machinery, radio and television equipment, 
electronics, automobiles, and aircraft—Japanese investors quickly narrowed the gap with the 
United States during the 1980s.
Competitiveness and Networks: The Example of the Japanese Auto Industry
To understand U.S.-Japanese industrial competitiveness and how it might affect the high- 
tech industry, policymakers should look to the automobile industry. No industry better 
illustrates this issue. And no firm more closely represents the strategies associated with a 
successful Japanese firm than Toyota. The “Toyota system” has been widely emulated by 
automobile firms and by firms in other highly competitive industries.3 Data on the Japanese 
automobile industry reveal that Japan’s share of world auto production increased from 2.9 
percent in 1960 to 29.7 percent in 1982. In that year, the Japanese auto industry was the 
world’s largest, capturing 19.2 percent of the U.S. market (Echeverri-Carroll 1994).
The preeminence of the Japanese automobile industry prompted the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology to create the International Motor Vehicle Program4 (IMVP) to study and 
identify the characteristics of a “successful” automobile firm. The MIT studies, as well as other 
studies outside the program,5 cite the creation o f networks with suppliers, customers, and other 
organizations as one of the most important components of the Japanese industrial organization. 
Of course, not all firms will benefit from Japanese-style networks. As Aoki (1986) points out, 
such networks seem to work best in industries that are marked by continuously changing demand
3 A good account of the success o f Japanese automobile and electronics firms against U.S. competitors is found in 
Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989) and Forester (1993).
4 The International Motor Vehicle Program at MIT was created in 1985 with the objective of conducting studies to 
help revitalize the U.S. automobile industry. By 1990, the program had published more than 116 monographs. 
Most o f the findings of these studies were summarized in a book titled The Machine That Changed the World by 
Womack et al., published in 1990.
5 See Altschuler 1985; Cusumano 1985; Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Dankbaar 1992; Helper 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1993; Helper and Sako 1995; Krafcik 1987; Krafcikand MacDuffie 1989; Lamming 1987; Minato 1991; Nishiguchi 
1987, 1994; Shimokawa 1982; and Womack et al. 1990.
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conditions and associated needs for continual adjustment in task coordination. These 
characteristics define competition in high-tech firms.
How do we define networks? Susan Helper, who directs the IMVP studies on supplier- 
customer relationships, distinguishes between arm's length supply systems, which characterize 
the “traditional” American firm, and voice relationships (that we use as a proxy for network 
systems), which characterize the Japanese firm,6 Arm’s-length relationships are short-term and 
involve little exchange of information between firms. In contrast, network systems are based on 
long-term relationships between firms, significant information exchange, joint problem solving, 
and governance by trust.7
Networks and Innovation
We argue, following Aoki (1986, 1990) and Sako and Helper (1997), that the significant 
knowledge exchange that characterizes Japanese-style networks exercises a positive influence on 
innovations. Knowledge is a key input in both the development of new products and processes 
and the speed at which they are introduced. As Feldman (1994) notes, commercially viable 
product innovations combine scientific and technical knowledge with knowledge of the market. 
The importance of knowledge for innovations is also recognized by Dosi (1988), who posits that 
innovation is perhaps best characterized as an intrinsically uncertain problem-solving process 
that blends private knowledge with public knowledge. Private knowledge comes primarily from 
within the firm while public knowledge is found in industry associations, scientific and 
professional societies, and networks of related firms and support services (Nelson 1988).
It could also be argued that the locational patterns of Japanese firms produce a positive 
effect on innovations. A good example of the geographical patterns usually associated with
6 Helper regularly surveys automobile suppliers in the United States to measure the extent to which they are 
implementing Japanese network systems. She finds that although there has been real progress by U.S. auto parts 
producers, many o f the changes in the relationship between suppliers and customers in the U.S. automobile industry 
have come at the suppliers’ expense.
7 A good summary o f the literature on contrasts between arm’s length and Japanese-style relationships is found in 
Echeverri-Carroll (1994, 1996).
3
Japanese firms is found in the Japanese automobile industry. Auto assembly, especially parts 
production, in Japan is heavily concentrated in the core industrial region of Keihin (Tokyo- 
Yokohama) and around Nagoya City (Sheard 1983). This same clustering pattern has been 
observed among Japanese automobile companies in the United States: Japanese transplant 
suppliers are concentrated mainly in the lower Midwest and upper South, in the same states that 
house transplant assembly facilities (Mair et al. 1988; Glasmeier and McCluskey 1987; Kenney 
and Florida 1992).
But what is the relationship between spatial proximity and innovations? Spatial 
proximity affects innovations in two ways. First, as anticipated by Krugman (1991), it reduces 
the costs of communication between firms.8 Cheaper communication creates incentives for more 
frequent contacts that result in an increasing exchange of knowledge. As noticed by Audretsch 
and Feldman (1996), the cost of transmitting knowledge increases with distance, even though the 
cost of transmitting information may be invariant to distance. Second, spatial proximity 
enhances knowledge spillovers. Firms cannot appropriate all the knowledge that they generate; 
therefore, some of their knowledge spills over to other firms. Because other firms do not pay for 
this knowledge, it is a knowledge externality. As Powell et al. (1996) point out, knowledge is 
difficult to capture inside the boundaries of an organization: most of the know-how is neither 
located inside an organization nor readily available for purchase.
Innovative activities therefore provide firms with an incentive to concentrate 
geographically to capture knowledge not only from other firms (including suppliers and 
customers), but also from local organizations such as universities and business services (Feldman 
1994). Indeed, the success of firms in developing new products and processes may be associated 
with the intensity of their communication with local firms. Saxenian (1994), for instance, points 
out that although firms in network systems serve global markets and collaborate with distant 
customers, suppliers, and competitors (technology firms, in particular, are highly international),
8 Although other authors recognize that locational patterns of auto suppliers close to the final assembly has given 
Japanese automobile firms a competitive advantage over U.S. firms (Cusumano 1985; Womack et al. 1990; Dyer 
1996), most o f these advantages have not been associated with their innovative performance.
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the most strategic relationships are often local. Timeliness and face-to-face communication are 
critical for rapid product development.
What This Means for the High-Tech Industry
Because high-technology industries employ a far greater proportion of scientists and 
engineers than other industries (Markusen et al. 1986), it is natural to assume that high-tech firms 
are highly localized because of the positive effects on innovations that result from a high local 
exchange of ideas. It could be argued, in this context, that the spatial agglomeration of suppliers 
and customers that characterizes Japanese firms could give them competitive advantages in the 
development of new products and processes. But this advantage is not unique to Japanese high- 
technology firms. In fact, Krugman (1991) notes that the fame of such clusters as California’s 
Silicon Valley and Boston’s Route 1289 have made the exchange of technical information one of 
the primary reasons for high-tech firms to agglomerate.
Malecki (1991) notes that high-technology firms are relatively concentrated in a few 
spatial clusters; however, the exchange of technical information may not necessarily be their main 
reason for concentrating. Marshall (1920) suggests that knowledge exchange is only one reason 
why firms in the same industry agglomerate; a pooled market of workers with specialized skills 
and the availability of specialized inputs are also important agglomerative forces. Accordingly, 
Krugman (1991) and Head et al. (1995) suggest that knowledge exchange is not always the 
typical reason for spatial agglomeration, even in high-technology industries. In fact, Krugman 
(1991) argues that high-technology firms agglomerate for reasons similar to those of non-high- 
technology firms. Silicon Valley, of course, is famous, but Krugman cites the equally remarkable 
concentrations to be found among carpet producers around Dalton, Georgia; jewelry producers 
around Providence, Rhode Island; and financial services in New York, Forces for localization 
other than those involving knowledge spillovers are evidently quite strong. Moreover, knowledge
9 The 27-mile stretch of the Route 128 highway links some 20 towns in the greater Boston area and provides a 
prestigious and attractive location for technology firms—one that is ideally situated within a short drive of M IT, 
Cambridge, and several desirable suburban communities.
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may be more expensive to transfer than information, but it may also benefit companies more than 
information, especially in terms of the positive effects that knowledge has on innovations. This 
may provide companies with an incentive to look for knowledge outside the city, thus capturing 
knowledge spillovers by maintaining strong external relationships.
This Study
Previous studies defined industries as high tech if the percentage of engineers and 
scientists employed exceeds that of the U.S. manufacturing industry as a whole. The main 
drawback of this definition is that different establishments within an industry may use different 
degrees of technology in their production processes. Thus, while some establishments may be 
high tech, it may not be accurate to label the entire industry high tech, To avoid this problem, we 
asked each establishment in our sample what percentage of its labor force is represented by 
engineers and scientists. Based on this information, we classified our sample into two groups of 
establishments. Those in which at least 6 percent of their total employees are engineers and 
scientists we call high-tech establishments, and those with a proportion of engineers and 
scientists less than 6 percent we call non-high-tech establishments.
Our study identifies and explains patterns of relationships and location in high- 
technology establishments and their effect on innovations. Specific questions include: How can 
a city attract innovative high-technology firms? How can a city attract high- instead of non-high- 
technology firms? How can Texas high-technology firms speed up their product and process 
innovations? In the process of developing new products and processes, do high-technology firms 
establish relationships mainly with local customers and suppliers? How can a large university 
have a positive effect on high-tech firms’ innovations?
These questions should be of interest to local policymakers and high-technology firms. 
Policies designed to enhance regional development through innovation should take into account 
whether local or non-local knowledge linkages are more significant for innovation. If linkages 
within a given region are more important for a firm’s innovative performance, policymakers will
6
be more interested in providing venues for local firms to meet and share information. However, if 
external linkages are more relevant, policymakers should focus on providing better 
communication to and from the area, including an airport that can provide frequent flights for 
skilled labor. The results of this study should also be of interest to Texas firms, especially those 
that are less innovative, by providing suggestions on what kinds of linkages are more important 
for improving their innovation performance.
The report is divided into several sections. Section 1 reviews the literature on Japanese 
knowledge and spatial networks with a focus on their contribution to innovations. Section 2 
reviews previous studies on the high-technology industry, highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of different criteria used to classify firms as high-technology firms. Section 3 
analyzes employment trends in the main high-technology regions in the United States, including 
five regions within Texas. Section 4 presents results from an empirical analysis of the 
contribution of knowledge networks and spatial proximity to the innovation performance of high- 
technology firms in Texas. The analysis is based on 23 interviews conducted with high- 
technology firms in the five largest metropolitan areas in Texas and on the results of a survey 
mailed to 1,772 high-technology manufacturing firms in the same metropolitan areas. Section 5 
presents conclusions from the analysis.
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Section 1 
The Japanese Model: Knowledge and Spatial Networks
Collaboration enhances firms’ learning and provides them with timely access to 
knowledge and resources that are otherwise unavailable, while it also tests firms5 internal 
expertise and learning capabilities (Hamel 1991; Dodgson 1993; Powell et al. 1996; Mowery and 
Rosenberg 1989; Arora and Gambardella 1994). Consequently, the degree to which a firm learns 
and increases its stock of knowledge is a function of the extent of its participation in network 
activities (Levinthal and March 1994; Brown and Duguid 1991; Von Hippel 1988). A firm’s 
learning is, however, both a function of its access to knowledge and its capability to utilize and 
build on that knowledge (Powell et al. 1996).
A firm’s access to knowledge is a necessary condition for innovation to take place. In the 
process of innovation, a firm consumes information, transforms it, and produces a new product 
or process in a form that can be regarded as information bearing. Gibbons and Johnston (1974), 
for instance, define innovation as a set of problems a firm must solve. In order to solve these 
problems, innovative firms must learn where to find information and how to use that information. 
Then, they must have additional information from either external sources or from memory in 
order to develop possible solutions to their problems. Allen (1977) also notes that engineers 
must first have information in order to understand and formulate the problem confronting them. 
Freeman (1994), citing Stiglitz (1987) and Lundvall (1992), indicates that the picture that emerges 
from numerous studies of innovation in firms is one of continuous interactive learning that occurs 
in the context of formal and informal relationships between firms. In short, the sources of 
innovations do not reside exclusively inside firms; instead, they are commonly found in the 
interstices between firms, universities, and research laboratories (Powell 1990).
Much of the discussion of networks of firms as learning organizations relates to Japanese 
firms.10 In fact, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) attribute much of the success of the Japanese firm
10 See, for instance, studies by Freeman 1994; Goto 1982; Schonbeger 1982; Imai 1989; Imai and Baba 1989; 
Fransman 1990; Kodama 1990, 1991; Tanaka 1991; Friedman and Samuels 1992; Sako 1992; Dodgson and Sako
9
to its competitive advantage as a learning organization. Its learning capabilities emerge from an 
organization based on knowledge and special networks. In the following subsections, we focus 
on the contribution of Japanese-style networks to innovations.
Knowledge Networks
Some economists, notably Aoki (1986, 1988, 1990, 1991), regard the Japanese firm as 
having a specific form of organization differing in many important characteristics from the 
organization of American and European firms. In fact, the underlying presumption that an 
important source of Japan’s industrial strength is in the organizational structure of the Japanese 
firm has generated a considerable economic and management literature in English dealing with 
various aspects of Japanese firms and with comparisons to their Western counterparts (Lamming 
1987; Nishiguchi 1987; Krafcik and MacDuffie 1989; Krafcik 1990; Womack et al. 1990; Aoki 
1990; Sayer and Walker 1992; Dore 1973,1985,1987).
Different firms’ organizational forms offer different advantages as well as disadvantages 
for innovations. For instance, vertical integration potentially protects a firm’s specialized 
research assets, permits it to capture the full gains associated with the resulting innovations, and 
provides an internal government scheme to manage organizational and technical uncertainties 
inherent in the innovation process (Nelson and Winter 1977). However, Tapon (1989) 
enumerates several failures inherent in a vertically integrated firm’s internal innovation process, 
including difficulty in selecting the problems to investigate, opportunism which distorts 
communication of scientific knowledge that conflicts with careers goals, and difficulty in deciding 
how to compensate scientists commensurate with the value of their discoveries.
Instead of integrating all the functions within its organization (vertical integration), a firm 
can buy some of the functions from other firms using two other organizational forms: arm’s 
length (open market) or networks (collaborative, long-term relationships). Networks, and in 
particular, Japanese-style networks, offer advantages in terms of innovations to high-tech firms
1993; Bowonder and Miyake 1993.
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competing in fast-changing markets (Aoki 1986). Womack et al. (1990: p, 142), for instance, 
describe problems associated with putting together about 25 parts for a new automobile seat 
being produced by arm’s length suppliers: “When the parts were finally put together in the 
finished seat, it was not surprising that a piece would not fit or that two abutting materials will 
prove incompatible. For example, they might rattle or squeak in cold weather because of 
different expansion coefficients.” These problems arise because an arm’s length relationship 
restricts the transfer of technical knowledge between firms and seriously erodes their ability to 
coordinate activities in the innovation process (Tapon 1989; Teece 1981; Von Hippel 1988; 
Bolton et al. 1994). Another problem is that high levels of uncertainty regarding the technical 
characteristics of an evolving product or process may permit inroads for opportunistic behavior 
(self-seeking interest) by an arm’s length exchange partner (Teece 1981).
On the contrary, network systems, or long-term collaborative arrangements between 
firms, facilitate the transfer of tacit (experiential) knowledge of the sort frequently involved in 
innovations. In particular, network systems offer advantages in the development and 
commercialization of new products to high-tech firms which experience high levels of uncertainty 
and short product cycles. There is, in fact, strong evidence that collaborative relationships 
(networks) with suppliers and customers gave Japanese innovative high-tech firms competitive 
advantages. Bolton et al. (1994), for instance, indicate that networks have accelerated the 
development of new technologies in the Japanese semiconductor equipment industry and have 
led to its extraordinarily rapid worldwide penetration. Moreover, using number of patents as an 
indicator of innovations, Grillinches (1989) notes that there has been a rapid growth in U.S. 
patents granted to Japanese electronics and motor vehicle firms. In fact, a recent study by NSF 
(1996) indicates that there was a dramatic increase in the number of U.S. patents granted to 
Japanese firms between 1983 and 1993, the latest year for which this information is available. 
According to this source, Japanese firms accounted for about 50% of all U.S. patents granted to 
foreign firms in 1993.
11
We use the contrast that Aoki (1990) establishes between the information structure of the 
American firm (denoted A firm) and the information structure of the Japanese firm (denoted J 
firm) as a pillar in our discussion of the correlation between characteristics of interfirm 
relationships and firms’ innovation performance.11 According to Aoki (1987, 1990), the main 
features of the coordination system of the J firm are (1) horizontal coordination among divisions 
within a firm or between different firms within a network and (2) sharing o f ex post on-site 
information (learned results). Production decisions are coordinated among semiautonomous units 
that gradually become capable of responding to emerging events more quickly by better uses of 
knowledge (information learned through experience). This is one of the primary reasons why the 
Japanese tend to emphasize long-term relationships with other firms (and “lifetime” 
employment).12
Asanuma (1989), Aoki (1986, 1990), and Dyer (1996) maintain that customers and 
suppliers of a J firm, as a group, become assets specific to the internal network, in the sense that 
at least some of the technical and technological expertise of the suppliers and customers is 
specific to its relation with the J firm. The information processing and communication abilities of 
firms participating in a network are nurtured largely through learning in the context of a firm- 
specific coordination network. Such abilities cannot be acquired prior to membership in the 
network and their value cannot be truly realized in isolation from it. Repeated contacts in 
network organizations increase knowledge about the partner firms. It is therefore not necessary 
to have contracts that completely cover all contingencies; instead, contracts between firms are 
mostly implicit or open-ended, where the parties continuously renegotiate their agreements 
(Helper and Levine 1992). In this process, suppliers do not merely manufacture components
11 However, because many American firms have emulated the Japanese way of communicating with suppliers and 
customers, it is difficult to talk of a pure American firm. In fact, some argue that the “Japanization” of U.S. 
manufacturing practices has slowed U.S. firms’ loss of existing markets to foreign competitors (Helper 1993; 
Cusumano 1985). And, more recently, there is some indication of convergence between the two systems (Helper 
and Sako 1995).
12 However, not all relations are collaborative. A firm usually establishes both collaborative and non-collaborative 
relationships with its suppliers. In the Japanese automobile industry, for instance, there is a wide range of 
technologically unsophisticated parts, such as boxes and cables, which are competitively sourced without extensive 
relationship building. It is, however, fair to assume that relationships conducive to innovations are mainly 
collaborative because o f the dependence of innovations on knowledge.
12
according to the specifications provided by the manufacturers; in the process of supplying 
components, many other things are also exchanged: technical information, financial assistance, 
and personnel, for example (Itoh 1994). In short, a multitude of reciprocal relations exists where 
firms agree to repeated interaction and to the sharing of knowledge.
The early exchange of knowledge that characterizes J firm networks considerably shortens 
the lead time necessary for the development of new products (Imai et al. 1985; Aoki 1986). In 
particular, suppliers design and do the pilot fabrication of new parts parallel to corresponding 
activities at the J firm, The early involvement of the supplier in the development of new 
products or processes results in better coordination between the supplier and the J firm. 
Coordination is also facilitated because engineers from important supplier firms are housed in the 
development laboratory of the J firm as “guest engineers” or participate in the J firm’s team on a 
permanent basis (Aoki 1984). However, early collaboration and exchange of information between 
firms in the development of new products only occurs once firms have developed expertise 
specific to the network, which requires firms to have worked together for a while (Aoki 1986).
On the contrary, in the traditional A firm, relationships between firms are performed in 
the context of an open market where prices are the sole means of coordination (Womack et al. 
1990). The relationship between firms is based on bidding on the lowest price for components. 
This one-time nature of transactions inhibits the continuous interaction needed for the 
development of network-specific expertise and increases the likelihood that contracts are based 
on “complete” legal agreements. Aoki (1986) points out that arm’s length relationships are 
advantageous to industries in which large scale planning across markets is beneficial or where 
non-repetitive coordination needs to be planned ex ante.
It is important to recognize that benefits associated with network organizations are not 
unique to the J firm, but to ail firms (including A firms) in rapidly changing markets that organize 
their relationships with other firms based on the same principles: long-term tenure and a 
continuous exchange of information, allowing for the development of relation-specific (or 
network-specific) expertise. Based on this assumption and the previous discussion, we
13
formulate the following hypothesis on the effects that relationships between firms have on firms’ 
performance:
HI: Firms in highly volatile markets would have better innovative performance if  they 
maintained network systems with suppliers and customers.
Spatial Proximity
The spatial proximity of suppliers that usually characterizes the Japanese firm has been 
associated with the need to deliver components on a just-in-time basis. The emphasis has been 
on exchange of products, not exchange of information between Japanese network firms, Some 
argue, however, that spatial contiguity leads to information and knowledge flows (Enright 1995; 
Malecki 1996; Jacobs 1968; Chinitz 1961; Lucas 1988; Glaeser 1993; Rauch 1991). As Krugman 
(1991) points out, physical proximity may enhance knowledge flows by making casual (informal) 
communication less costly. In the case of the Japanese firm, Head et al. (1995) find support for 
the hypothesis that industry-level agglomeration benefits—including access to knowledge—have 
played an important role in the location decision of these firms in the United States.
Spatial agglomeration facilitates knowledge transfer not only between firms, but also 
between other organizations that are also important sources of "urban” knowledge—in particular, 
universities and high-tech services. Mowery (1995), for instance, notices that proximity to a 
network of other firms, universities, and support services remains critical to innovations, Jaffe 
(1989) and Feldman (1994) also found that product innovations exhibit a pronounced tendency 
to cluster geographically, and this geographic concentration at the state level is related to the level 
of university R&D and industry R&D expenditures in the state. In this view, innovation is a 
process facilitated by diverse types of expertise and knowledge available in cities (Kline and 
Rosenberg 1987).
Innovation is associated with the process through which knowledgeable people interact 
with one another and learn from this interaction. This interaction is enhanced by spatial 
proximity. One of the first researchers to make a connection between location and innovations
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was Bairoch (1989), who pointed out that towns favor both innovation and the dissemination of 
new technologies across wider areas. A large concentration of people generates more ideas, and 
because innovations depend on knowledge, innovations will be greater in places with a large pool 
of knowledgeable people. Thus, innovations are one of the benefits that result from the 
agglomeration of firms in space (Glaeser 1993; Rauch 1991; Jaffe et al. 1983; Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996; Audretsch and Stephan 1996).13 The assumption behind this argument is that the 
concentration of skilled labor in one place speeds up the flow of information that leads to new 
products and processes. In particular, there is a belief that a large agglomeration of a specialized 
industry speeds up the movement of ideas by facilitating high levels of interfirm worker mobility 
and informal communication among engineers and scientists.
The idea of a positive relationship between proximity and firms’ innovation performance 
presupposes the assumption that distance reduces the ability to receive knowledge. There may 
be geographical boundaries to knowledge flows, particularly tacit knowledge flows, among firms 
in an industry (Marshall 1920, Krugman 1991). In this respect, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) 
argue that although the cost of transmitting information may be invariant to distance, presumably 
the cost of transmitting knowledge rises with distance. That is, proximity and location do matter 
in the transmission of knowledge. In this view, although firms in network systems serve global 
markets and collaborate with distant customers, suppliers, and competitors (technology firms, in 
particular, are highly international), the most strategic relationships are often local because of the 
importance of timeliness and face-to-face communication for rapid product development. 
Neighboring firms can learn from each other much better than geographically isolated firms 
(Saxenian 1994). This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Innovations depend on contacts between knowledgeable people, and these contacts are 
facilitated by spatial proximity. Thus, we will expect that the most innovative high- 
technology firms would tend to have strong local networks.
Other benefits include availability of specialized labor and services, savings in transportation costs, and 
economies of scale (Krugman 1994).
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While acknowledging the important role that knowledge spillovers play in the localization 
of some industries, Krugman (1991) and Head et al. (1995) are wary about assuming that this is 
the dominant reason—even in high-technology industries where most innovative activity takes 
place, Krugman (1991) cautions that there is no reason to assume that the motives for high- 
technology firms to agglomerate are different from the motives for non-high-technology firms. 
According to Marshall (1920), there are two other compelling reasons, besides the flow of ideas, 
for firms in the same industry to agglomerate: a pooled market of workers with specialized skills 
and the availability of specialized inputs and services. A localized industry will attract 
specialized workers for two reasons. First, as argued by David and Rosenbloom (1990), the 
spatial concentration of industry is advantageous to laid-off workers who will be able to find jobs 
with other firms, Hence, an increased number of firms reduces the likelihood that a worker will 
suffer a long bout of unemployment. Second, workers in a determined location will be more 
inclined to invest in industry-specific human capital if they feel confident of their ability to 
appropriate the benefits (Rotember and Saloner 1990). By mitigating the hold-up problem, 
agglomeration generates the development of more industry-specific skills. A large industry will 
also create a spatial demand of considerable size to allow complementary business services to 
exhaust economies of scale. Furthermore, the presence of specialized services in the city will 
allow the large industry to buy some of the functions from other firms in the city. In short, 
spatial proximity to other businesses allows a firm to enjoy the benefits of higher levels of 
specialization.
There are two hypotheses about the relationship between spatial agglomeration and 
innovations. According to Krugman (1991) and Head et al. (1995), the exchange of ideas (and its 
positive effect on innovations) is not the main reason why high-technology firms agglomerate; 
rather, economies of specialization associated with specialized labor and specialized services are 
the main reason. In this sense, the reasons why high-technology firms locate near each other are 
not very dissimilar from the ones for non-high-technology firms—essentially, the availability of 
specialized labor, inputs, and services. Thus, the clustering of the high-technology industry is
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the result of benefits associated with firms’ specialization, not those associated with local 
knowledge. Most knowledge relevant to the development and commercialization of new 
products and processes would come from linkages with organizations outside the region, not 
necessarily from linkages in the local economy. Based on Krugman (1991) and Head et al.
(1995), we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: Innovations depend mainly on non-local knowledge externalities from linkages with 
economic organizations outside the region. Thus, we would expect that innovative 
firms tend to have sfrong non-local linkages.
Before we analyze employment trends in high-technology regions and estimate our logit 
models to test the hypotheses resulting from the literature review, we need to choose criteria that 
allow us to classify industries as high tech. Thus, the following section summarizes the 
discussion on various criteria to classify industries as high or non-high-tech.
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Section 2 
Definition of High-Technology Manufacturing and Services
Most of the issues in deciding whether to classify an industry as high tech revolve around 
finding a proxy for technology. Once this proxy is found, defining whether an industry is high 
tech is an easy task. This usually implies dividing industries into two groups: industries for 
which the selected proxy for technology shows a value above the average for all industries (the 
high-tech group) and those showing a value below this average (the non-high-tech group). The 
difficulty arises because “technology” is a broad concept that can be associated with, among 
other things, products, processes, services, know-how, R&D, innovations, skilled labor, and 
machinery and equipment. Identifying high-tech industries is difficult even when one assumes 
that several of these characteristics define a high-technology industry—that is, it might be an 
industry that produces high-tech products, invests highly in R&D, is highly innovative, and uses 
a lot of know-how and high-tech processes and equipment. Yet, what about an industry that 
produces a “non-high-tech” product but uses high-tech equipment, such as the production of 
chocolate chip cookies (an example mentioned by Broz et al. 1993)? Is it a non-high-tech firm? 
Moreover, although most of these measures are positively correlated, levels of correlation vary 
between them. For instance, Feldman (1994) reports correlations with innovations (measured as 
the number of new products from the Small Business Administration Data Base) of 0.85 with 
R&D, but of only 0.70 with high-tech employment (as defined by Markusen et al. 1986).
There are also problems in the definition associated with changes over time—an industry 
may be high tech at one time, but not at a later date. Malecki (1991), for instance, suggests that if 
high-tech firms use the latest technology, the industries in which they are involved will be 
younger. The semiconductor industry, which did not exist 30 years ago, is a good example of 
this. Another time consideration is the degree of product/process obsolescence (OECD Study 
1986 cited by Butler 1992). One would expect that high-tech firms work in rapidly changing 
areas, and therefore experience a higher degree of product and/or process change than other
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industries. The major disadvantage to this definition is that it has not yet been made operational. 
Obsolescence may be hard to measure, as processes sometimes remain in existence several years 
after they have become outdated.
Other proxies for high technology come from the assumption that high-technology 
industries are those that create economic progress. If economic progress is understood in the 
“growth pole” context, high-technology industries should have extensive links to other industries. 
Imai (1988), for instance, defines high-technology industries as being “system oriented,” which 
implies that they create products used in many other industries. Moreover, Malecki (1991) 
maintains that if high-tech industries are propulsive sectors (with strong backward and forward 
linkages), then they should grow faster than other industries. There is not, however, an objective 
reason to anticipate that high-tech industries should have strong backward and forward linkages.
Most empirical studies that classify industries as high tech use as a criterion either a 
proxy of technology intensity or a proxy for the contribution of firms to economic development, 
in particular, job creation (Office of Technology Assessment 1984).
Proxies to Measure High-Technology Manufacturing
Job generation: percentage increase in industry employment, compared to average o f all 
industries (Technical Market Associates 1979 cited in Markusen et al. 1986). The hypothesis is 
that high-technology industries generate more jobs than other industries. This neglects high- 
technology industries that are not yet commercially viable and have not led to rapid employment 
growth. It also misclassifies high-technology industries in which employment growth fluctuates, 
such as defense industries. Finally, it fails to acknowledge other sources of job growth, such as 
relative price changes or import substitution. This definition then includes as high-tech industries 
those which experience rapid employment growth, whether or not they actually are high tech.
Research and development: R&D as a percentage o f value-added or as a percentage o f  
sales (Davis 1982, Scherer 1982). The hypothesis is that high-tech industries have higher than 
average R&D expenditures, which implies that high-tech industries are at the early stages of the
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product cycle. Once a product matures (so that R&D is no longer crucial), the industry is no 
longer considered high tech. A disadvantage of using R&D expenditure to measure the level of 
technology of an industry is that one may misclassify mature industries that could reasonably be 
called high tech. One may also misclassify industries or products which have high value-added or 
large sales, even if a relatively large amount is spent on R&D. Finally, many measures of R&D 
aggregate quite different mixes of basic and applied research with the more routine advertising and 
marketing research, the latter of which has virtually nothing to do with technology.
Researcher perception: views or opinions o f “experts ” are used to classify industries as 
high tech. This definition allows the researcher leeway to base classification on several factors at 
once without limiting the weight put on any one factor. The weaknesses of this method of 
classifying industries are obvious. First, no objective criteria are used to classify industries, so 
links between causes and effects are impossible to measure. Second, classification is based on 
opinions, which differ from individual to individual and country to country. An example of this 
kind of definition is the one used by the American Electronic Association (1997).
Capital/skilled-labor intensity: measure o f  the physical capital-to-skilled-labor ratio o f  an 
industry. The hypothesis is that high-technology industries are more skilled-labor intensive than 
other industries; therefore, they will show low ratios of capital to labor. Because high-tech 
industries usually have higher levels of innovation, they are more likely to employ highly skilled 
workers in production in place of large amounts of capital. The major disadvantage of this 
definition is that some industries with relatively high capital investments may not be classified as 
high tech. Such would be the case of the semiconductor industry, where specialized equipment 
for research leads to a very high capital/skilled labor ratio.
Information intensity: importance o f information, as a product or input, to the industry. 
The hypothesis is that high-technology industries are much more information intensive than 
others. However, information intensity would be hard to measure.
Defense related: federal government or defense contractor as major customer. Many 
high-technology industries arose from defense-related spending, so lots of defense-related work
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implies that the industry is high tech. However, the Department of Defense also buys a lot of 
non-high-tech products. Moreover, not all high-tech firms have defense contracts.
Employment statistics: percentage o f “human capital” jobs in an industry. High human 
capital jobs include engineers, technicians, scientists, mathematicians, or a combination thereof. 
The hypothesis is that high-technology industries employ more highly-skilled workers than other 
industries. Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier (1986) found that the national average of engineers, 
engineering technicians, computer scientists, life scientists, and mathematicians for all industries 
was 5.82 percent.14 They defined industries as high tech if the industry average exceeds 5.82 
percent. Based on this classification scheme, 29 sectors (3-digit SIC) were classified as high tech. 
Within these sectors, 100 4-digit industries were listed as high tech (see Table 1 in Appendix A). 
The main drawback of this definition is that while some firms may be high tech, it may not be 
accurate to label the entire industry high tech. More specifically, definitions of high-technology 
industries based on the SIC system do not account for technological differences between firms in 
the same industry or between establishments (or plants) within the same firm. We avoid this 
problem by asking each establishment in our sample what percentage of its labor force is 
represented by engineers and scientists (to our knowledge, this is the first time that this exercise 
has been done). Based on this information, we reclassified each establishment in our sample into 
two groups of firms. Those in which at least 6 percent of their total employees are engineers and 
scientists we classify as high-tech firms, and those with a proportion of engineers and scientists 
less than 6 percent we classify as non-high-tech firms.
We use a definition of high technology that is based on the percentage of human capital in 
a manufacturing establishment because it offers several competitive advantages over other 
definitions. In particular, human skills highly correlate with other indicators of “technological” 
performance, such as R&D (Berman et al. 1994), the stock of capital, and information intensity. 
Job classifications are available from objective (rather than self-reported) sources and carry across 
industries (manufacturing and service). Human capital is associated with positive effects on
14 Based on the 1980 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey-based matrix.
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economic development at the national (Romer 1986; Suarez-Villa 1990) and regional (Glaeser 
1994; Lucas 1988; Rauch 1991; Krugman 1991) levels. More important, communication between 
individuals with large endowments of human capital is the main input in the production of 
knowledge and therefore innovations, the focus of this study.
High-Technology Services
The term ‘producer services’ generally includes the following non-production activities: 
finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE); legal services; transportation and communication; 
accounting; advertising and marketing; research and development; data processing; and worker 
and management training. Hansen (1994) notes that the SIC categorization scheme insufficiently 
distinguishes the different markets for services and classification of business functions; however, 
it is still the best available classification scheme for consideration of producer services. He uses 
two sectors, Business Services (SIC 73) and Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management and 
Related Services (SIC 87), as best approximation for producer services. Beyers and Lindahl
(1996), who focus on processes externalized by large corporations due to specialization of 
function, include a different subgroup of SIC codes in their definition of producer services (SIC 
61-64, 736, 737, 7389, 81, and 871-874).
This report is concerned with employment in producer services which are considered high 
tech. Vinson and Harrington (1979, cited by Markusen et al. 1991) list the following high-tech 
industry service-related SIC codes (changed to reflect 1987 categorization codes), as determined 
by product sophistication: Computer Programming, Data Processing, and Other Computer 
Related Services (SIC 737, except 7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair); Engineering, 
Architectural, and Surveying Services (SIC 871); Research, Development, and Testing Services 
(SIC 873); Management and Public Relations Services (SIC 874); and Accounting, Auditing, and 
Bookkeeping Services (SIC 8721). This is the classification we use in this report.
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Section 3 
Employment Changes in U.S. High-Technology Regions
The focus of this section is a comparative analysis of changes in employment in what we 
call the “traditional” high-technology regions—Silicon Valley,15 Research Triangle Park (RTP),16 
Route 128,17 and Southern California18—and in the five largest metropolitan areas in Texas— 
Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Austin, This section is divided into two parts. 
In the first part, we analyze employment changes in the four traditional high-technology regions, 
highlighting some important historical features of the development of these regions. In the 
second part, we analyze the dynamics of relatively “new” high-technology regions in Texas.
The Traditional High-Tech Regions
Consistent with the focus in this section on changes in high-tech employment, this 
subsection presents a very brief history of the high-technology industiy in each traditional 
region. We also keep this section short because these regions have been extensively analyzed in 
previous studies, A detailed account of the high-technology industry in Silicon Valley is found in 
Saxenian (1994), Route 128 in Saxenian (1994), Southern California in Scott (1993), and Research 
Triangle Park in Luger and Goldstein (1991). Premus (1982) and Campbell (1986) have done 
comparative studies of Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Research Triangle.
In all of the traditional high-technology areas, proximity to a major university proved 
crucial for development of a high-tech concentration because proximity generated relationships 
which led to the formation of firms that commercialized academic research. Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 developed through a combination of spin-offs from university research—Stanford
15 Silicon Valley includes five California counties: Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Cruz, and Santa 
Clara.
16 The Research Triangle Park includes six North Carolina counties: Chatham, Durham, Franklin, Johnston, 
Orange, and Wake.
17 Route 128 includes four Massachusetts counties: Middlesex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Essex.
18 The high technology complex of Southern California includes seven counties: Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, 
Ventura, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, and San Bernardino.
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University for Silicon Valley and Massachusetts Institute of Technology for Route 128. A 
second factor in the development of these concentrations of high-technology firms was defense- 
related spending. Route 128, Southern California, and Silicon Valley have received significant 
defense-related contracts, This is less true for RTP; however, government support was crucial in 
the formation of the park and remains key.
Silicon Valley’s history begins in 1909, when Stanford’s president funded research on the 
vacuum tube. In the late 1930s, David Hewlett and William Packard formed a company to 
commercialize research in audio oscillators that they had done as students at Stanford. By the 
1950s, several other research projects had led to the creation of businesses, and Silicon Valley had 
begun (Saxenian 1994).
Route 128 began in the 1950s, with the founding of Digital Equipment Corp. (DEC) by 
Ken Olsen, Stan Olsen, and Harlan Anderson (Hansen and Dabney 1994). This company was a 
spin-off from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but led the region on a different trajectory 
than the one Silicon Valley took. Development of Route 128, most of which occurred in the 
1970s and 1980s, was mainly through federal government funding of large companies. Major 
companies located in the area include DEC, Lotus Development, and Wang (Saxenian 1994).
Research Triangle Park, founded in 1959, was one of the first “planned” high-tech 
concentrations.19 It is located in North Carolina, in the triangle between Duke University, North 
Carolina State University, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Occupancy in 
RTP did not really take off until IBM located in the park in 1965 (Luger and Goldstein 1991). 
American and foreign firms in RTP work in several areas of high technology, including 
biotechnology, electronics, computers, and telecommunications. The only requirement for a firm 
wishing to locate within the park is that they be engaged in “research, development, and 
scientifically oriented production.” Thus, while RTP is not specifically designed to attract high-
19 According to Luger and Goldstein, RTP’s strategy has been “to place the highest priority on attracting the 
branch plants o f major corporations rather than new, small, start-up, technology-oriented businesses” (p. 78).
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technology firms, the requirement of scientific R&D has Jed to a concentration of high-tech firms 
in the area (Luger and Goldstein 1991).
According to Scott (1993), the birth of the aircraft industry in Southern California 
occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. Among the earliest aircraft firms to settle in the region were the 
Douglas Aircraft Company and the Lockheed Aircraft Company. The aerospace-electronics 
industrial complex of Southern California became more deeply entrenched in the region in the 
1950s, and it came typically to consist of large establishments surrounded by dense networks of 
smaller establishments providing various kinds of specialized material inputs and services. Four 
major industrial sectors would seem to embody most of the high-technology industrial activity in 
the region: Ordnance (i.e., missiles) and Accessories (SIC 19), Communications Equipment (SIC 
366), Electronic Components (SIC 367), and Aircraft and Parts (SIC 372) (Scott 1993).
To analyze employment changes, both in high-tech manufacturing and high-tech services 
in these regions, we used data from County Business Patterns for 1989 and 1993 (the latest years 
for which these data are available)20 (see Table 2).
20 We used 1993 data since these were the latest data available at the tune of this research. Data for 1994 are now 
available, though we do not expect that using 1994 data would significantly change our results. More current 
employment data are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but these data are available only at the state level.
Table 2. Employment data by high-technology regions for 1989 and 1993.
Region High-technology
services
High-technology
m anufacturing
Total high 
technology
Total
manufacturing
Total
employment
1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993 1989 1993
San Antonio 10,670 16,632 7,192 6,898 17,862 23,530 45,855 47,533 576,368 643,858
Austin 14,796 21,152 27,024 32,518 41,820 53,670 46,125 54,567 391,069 468,689
Fort Worth 12,456 18,678 54,317 44,349 66,773 63,027 112,390 100,791 542,206 603,674
Dallas 60,780 78,249 68,931 67,205 129,711 145,454 235,589 225,560 1,442,786 1,576,709
Houston 66,062 86,371 58,472 63,460 124,534 149,831 170,853 188,310 1,551,653 1,722,567
Texas total 164,764 221,082 215,936 214,430 380,700 435,512 610,812 616,761 4,504,082 5,015,497
Research Triangle 17,864 23,921 23,276 40,560 41,140 64,481 78,530 76,496 476,778 530,471
Route 128 90,479 114,010 115,035 85,052 205,514 199,062 314,418 241,997 ' 1,528,419 1,391,614
Silicon Valley 127,950 139,172 203,232 151,823 331,182 290,995 549,085 418,752 2,559,100 2,514,414
Southern CA 285,949 297,259 445,498 353,325 731,447 650,584 1,449,945 1,166,344 7,971,581 7.672,068
These data were extracted from County Business Patterns (CBP) CD ROMs for 1989-90 and 1992-93. Total Employment was calculated as the sum of total employment 
from CPB (which excludes the government sector) plus government totals from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) CD ROM. Data were collected by county and 
aggregated for regional totals. See Appendix B for explanation of how total employment was calculated.
High-tech manufacturing industries were determined according to the definition of Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier (1986). The definition is based on percentage of 
engineers, engineering technicians, computer scientists, life scientists, and mathematicians in the industry labor force, and comprises 100 four-digit SIC codes (see 
Appendix A). High-tech service industries were determined by product sophistication according to Vinsen and Harrington (1979) and include the following SIC codes 
(changed to reflect 1987 categorization codes): 737 Computer Programming, Data Processing, and Other Computer Related Services, 871 Engineering, Architectural, 
and Surveying Services, 873 Research. Development, and Testing Services, and 874 Management and Public Relations Services. This definition is extended to include 
all four-digit SIC codes included within this group (except 7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair) and also includes 8721 Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping 
Services.
The following counties are included in each region:
San Antonia—Bexar, Comal, Guadalupe, Wilson.
Austin—Bastrop, Caldwell, Hays, Travis, Williamson.
Fort W orth—Hood, Johnson, Parker, Tarrant.
Dallas— Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hunt, Kaufman, Rockwall.
Houston—Chambers, Fort Bend, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery, Waller.
Research Triangle—Chatham, Durham, Franklin, Johnston, Orange, Wake.
Route 128—Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk.
Southern California—Santa Barbara, Los Angles, Ventura, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, San Bernardino.
Silicon Valley—Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara (includes San Jos6).
Figure 1 shows that Southern California is by far the largest among traditional liigh- 
technology regions in the United States, employing 650,584 workers in high-tech manufacturing 
and services in 1993. This high-tech region had twice the Silicon Valley high-tech employment 
(including both manufacturing and services), four times that of Route 128, and eight times that of 
RTP in 1993.
Figure 1. High-tech employment* by region for 1989 and 1993.
800,000 -j
San Austin Fort Worth Dallas Houston R esearch  Route 128 Silicon Southern 
Antonio T riangle V alley CA
* The sum of high-tech services and manufacturing. Source: Table 2.
In spite of the significance usually associated with the high-technology industry in the 
traditional high-tech regions, employment data indicate that the dependency of these regions on 
high tech is relatively low. Figure 2 shows that in 1993, high-tech employment (including both 
manufacturing and services) was only 14 percent of total employment in Route 128, 12 percent 
in RTP, 11 percent in Silicon Valley, and 8 percent in Southern California. Even when only 
participation in manufacturing employment is considered, all traditional regions show a 
significant level of manufacturing diversification outside the high-technology sector.
Thus, as Figure 3 indicates, with the exception of RTP, in which high-tech manufacturing 
employment jumped from 29 to 53 percent between 1989 and 1993, high technology represented
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less than 35 percent of manufacturing employment in the other three traditional high-tech regions 
in 1993. It is important to note that between 1989 and 1993, all the traditional regions lost high- 
tech employment. Southern California lost 80,863 high-tech jobs, followed by Silicon Valley 
with 40,187 and Route 128 with 6,452. Only the RTP region gained high-tech jobs (23,341).
Figure 2. High-tech employment* as percentage of total employment
by region for 1989 and 1993.
San Austin Fort W orth Dallas Houston R esearch  Route 128 Silicon Southern 
Antonio T riangle V alley CA
H 1 9 8 9  
a  1 9 9 3
* The sum o f high-tech services and manufacturing. Source: Table 2,
Data from Table 3 in Appendix C show that specialization by high-tech manufacturing 
sectors varies by region. In 1993, Route 128 was highly diversified with several high-tech sectors 
contributing to the performance of the high-technology industry in this area, including electronic 
components, semiconductors, surgical and medical instruments, aircraft engines and engine parts, 
and telephone and telegraph equipment. Silicon Valley was somewhat less diversified, producing 
mainly semiconductors, computers, missiles and space vehicles, and electronic components. 
Conversely, Southern California was heavily specialized in the production of aircraft, aircraft 
parts, and missiles and space vehicles, while RTP was mainly specialized in the production of 
computers. Differences in the magnitude of employment in the top high-tech manufacturing 
sectors in each region is quite dramatic. For instance, in 1993, the top high-tech manufacturing
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sector in Southern California, aircraft and aircraft parts, employed 88,000, while the top high- 
tech manufacturing sector in Route 128, electronic components, employed only 9,000.
Figure 3. High-tech manufacturing as percentage of total 
manufacturing employment for 1989 and 1993,
Antonio T riangle Valley CA
Source: Table 2,
In terms of high-tech services, data from Table 4 in Appendix C indicate that Route 128 
specialized in Engineering Services (SIC 8711), Prepackaged Software (SIC 7372), and Computer 
Programming Services (SIC 7371); Southern California specialized mainly in Accounting, 
Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services (SIC 8721) and in Engineering Services; Silicon Valley in 
Prepackaged Software and Engineering Services; and RTP in Engineering Services, Commercial 
Physical and Biological Research (SIC 8731), and computer-related services (SIC 7373 and 7371). 
Differences in the magnitude of employment in the top high-tech service sectors in each region is 
also quite dramatic. For instance, in 1993, in Southern California, the two top high-technology 
services, Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services and Engineering Services, employed 
64,000 and 51,000, respectively, while in RTP, the top high-tech service sector, Engineering 
Services, employed only 3,000.
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High-Technology Regions in Texas
Unlike the situation for the traditional high-tech regions, there is no single source for the 
history of the high-technology industry in Texas; only short and discontinuous highlights for 
each metropolitan area are available.21 This is probably because high-tech specialization in the 
five largest metropolitan areas of Texas (Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Austin) 
is so diverse. A history of the chemical industry in Houston would shed little light on the 
concentration of aircraft manufacturers in Fort Worth or semiconductor firms in Austin and 
Dallas. Statements that apply to the aircraft industry in Fort Worth will not apply equally to 
the petrochemical industry in Houston. Cuts in defense spending have impacted Fort Worth and 
Dallas much more than Austin.
Austin: The Silicon Hill
In the late 1950s, four graduate students of the University of Texas School of Engineering 
founded Tracor Inc., probably the first large high-tech firm in Austin. IBM arrived in 1967, 
focusing its worldwide development of office systems in Austin. Motorola, whose memory 
technologies and microprocessor divisions are headquartered in Austin, located its first facility 
here in 1974. Applied Materials, the world’s largest supplier of equipment to the semiconductor 
industry, began its first Austin facility in 1990. These companies have been joined by Advanced 
Micro Devices (AMD), Texas Instruments, Data General, Tandem Computers, Rolm, and others.
Austin’s concentration of semiconductor manufacturing has increased significantly. In 
1995, both Motorola and AMD completed SI billion wafer fabrication facilities, which are among 
the most capital intensive of facilities in any industry. Samsung Electronics, the industry’s 
largest memory manufacturer, is also building a $ 1.3 billion memory manufacturing facility in 
Austin. Two research consortia dedicated to U.S. technological leadership in computers and 
microelectronics, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) and
21 See, for instance, the Houston Business Journal for Houston, the Dallas Business Journal for Dallas and Fort 
Worth, the San Antonio Business Journal for San Antonio, and the Austin Business Journal for Austin.
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Sematech, are headquartered in Austin. Austin has also become a national center for software 
development with more than 500 software companies already present.
The Austin Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) consists of Bastrop, Caldwell, Hays, 
Travis, and Williamson counties. As data from Table 2 indicate, total high-tech employment in 
both manufacturing and services in the Austin metro area was 53,670 in 1993, with 32,518 in 
manufacturing and 21,152 in services. Total high-tech employment accounts for only 11.4 
percent of total employment in the Austin MSA, indicating a high level of economic 
diversification (see Figure 1). However, high-technology employment accounts for almost 60 
percent of manufacturing employment in this area, a greater concentration of high-tech 
manufacturing employment than in any of the other major high-tech areas considered in this 
report (see Figure 3). The Austin MSA gained 11,850 high-tech jobs between 1989 and 1993 
(see Table 2). Data from Table 3 indicate that the top two high-technology manufacturing 
sectors (and the most dynamic ones) in the Austin MSA are Electronic Components (SIC 3679) 
and Semiconductors (SIC 3674), with employment gains of 4,000 and nearly 2,000, respectively, 
between 1989 and 1993.
High-tech services gained 6,356 new jobs between 1989 and 1993. Engineering Services 
(SIC 8711) is the top high-tech service industry in the Austin MSA; however, the largest 
employment gains between 1989 and 1993 occurred in Management Services (SIC 8741) and 
Computer Integrated System Design Services (SIC 7373) (see Table 4).
With the exception of one firm, all the firms we interviewed in Austin produce in at least 
one of these two sectors: Electronic Components and Semiconductors. When asked the reasons 
for being in Austin, the most important reason mentioned in our interviews was the quality of life 
in Austin. Quality of life plays a key role in several forms: the nice weather and a large 
percentage of highly educated people (more books are purchased per capita in this city than 
almost any other city in the United States) make it easier for firms to attract engineers from 
outside the city. The location of other high-tech firms in Austin also makes workers more 
interested in living in this city. It is easy to get customers to visit Austin all year round (this
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benefit becomes more important in winter). Other reasons given were: (a) the founder was here 
either because he got his Ph.D. at the University of Texas or the firm is a spin-off from a large 
high-tech firm already located in the city, (b) the major customers are located here, or (c) the city 
is centrally located for distribution to customers located outside the city.
Dallas: Defense Cuts and Diversification
The Dallas MSA consists of Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hunt, Kaufman, 
and Rockwall counties. As data in Table 2 indicate, total high-tech employment in the Dallas 
metro area was 145,454 in 1993, with 67,205 in manufacturing and 78,249 in services. The area 
is highly diversified, with only 9.2 percent of total employment in the high-tech manufacturing 
and services sectors in 1993 (see Figure 2), Moreover, high-tech employment was only 30 
percent of manufacturing employment in the Dallas MSA in 1993 (see Figure 3). Dallas’ high- 
technology industry centers around semiconductors, telecommunications, and defense-related 
sectors such as aircraft parts production.
The Dallas metropolitan area gained 15,743 high-tech jobs between 1989 and 1993. 
However, most of the gains were in the service sector; high-tech manufacturing lost 1,726 jobs. 
Data from Table 4 in Appendix C indicate that the top high-tech manufacturing sectors are 
Aircraft Parts (SIC 3728) and Semiconductors (SIC 3674). Also, a large telecommunications 
sector specialized in the manufacture of Telephones and Telegraph Equipment (SIC 3661) is 
located in Richardson, a Dallas suburb. In fact, while the first two sectors experienced job losses, 
the Telephones and Telegraph Equipment sector gained 4,185 new jobs between 1989 and 1993. 
This shift is the result of the metropolitan area beginning to reduce its dependence on the defense 
industry and to concentrate on other high-technology industry sectors that are less dependent on 
defense contracts, such as semiconductors and telecommunications. The defense industry in 
Texas is the second largest in the nation, with many of the state’s largest defense companies 
operating in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. General Dynamics, Bell Helicopter/Textron, Vought 
Aircraft, and Texas Instruments accounted for over 50 percent of defense contracts in 1991
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(Greater Dallas Chamber 1996). Reductions in defense spending have hit the Dallas area hard: 
aircraft parts production lost 9,710 jobs between 1989 and 1993.
Contraiy to the scenario in the manufacturing sector, high-tech services in the Dallas 
metropolitan area gained 17,469 new jobs between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2). Computer 
Processing and Data Preparation Services (SIC 7374) and Management Services (SIC 8741) are 
by far the two largest high-tech services in the Dallas MSA. Computer Processing and Data 
Preparation Services gained 1,327 jobs between 1989 and 1993, while Management Services (SIC 
8741) and Management Consulting Services (SIC 8742) gained 4,768 and 2,069 jobs, 
respectively, during the same period (see Table 4).
Of the four Dallas firms we interviewed, two are in the telecommunications industry, one 
is involved in semiconductor production, and one is involved in both industries. Company A is 
located in Richardson mainly because of the airport—it is easy to get from DFW to any place in 
the world. Additionally, Richardson is a nice place to live—the schools are good and housing is 
relatively inexpensive. This company can find experienced labor here; in fact, there is quite a bit 
of labor market fluidity, as engineers often move from this company to competitor firms also 
located in Richardson and vice versa, Company B is located in Dallas mostly due to historical 
accident (it was founded here in the 1930s to supply equipment to oil drilling companies). 
Company B also mentioned as an advantage the airport, which makes it easy for this company to 
access global markets. Company C is also located in Dallas because of historical accident; it 
started in Dallas 50 years ago; additionally, other telecommunications companies provide a 
source of engineers, which this company likes to hire from its local competitors. Company D 
was a spin-off of Texas Instruments. Dallas is a good location for the firm because there are 
other high-tech firms in the area, which are a source of qualified technicians.
Fort Worth: Aircraft Production
The Fort Worth MSA consists of Hood, Johnson, Parker and Tarrant counties. Total 
high-tech employment accounted for 63,027 in the Fort Worth metropolitan area in 1993, with
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44,349 employed in manufacturing and 18,678 in services. High-tech employment accounted for 
only 10.4 percent of total employment in this MSA in 1993. However, high-tech employment 
was 48 percent of total manufacturing employment in 1989 and 44 percent in 1993 (see Figure
2). The top manufacturing high-tech sector by far is Aircraft Production (SIC 3721) (see Figure
3), due to the Lockheed-Martin plant located in Fort Worth which employs more than 12,000 
workers. In 1989, employment in the aircraft industry was 8.5 times larger than employment in 
the next four largest high-tech manufacturing sectors combined. The Fort Worth area was also 
strongly hit by cuts in defense spending, resulting in the net loss of 9,968 jobs in manufacturing. 
The impact of defense cuts is seen more clearly when we analyze employment changes by 
sectors. Aircraft Production lost 20,000 between 1989 and 1993, but Production of Aircraft 
Parts gained 6,000 jobs in the in the same period (see Table 4).
High-tech services gained 6,222 new jobs between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2). The top 
high-tech sendees in the Fort Worth MSA are Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services 
(SIC 8721) and Engineering Services (SIC 8711). Between 1989 and 1993, 886 jobs were lost in 
the first sector, while only 136 jobs were gained in the second sector (see Table 4). However, 
other service sectors such as Management Consulting Services (SIC 8741) and Information 
Retrieval Services (SIC 7375) showed gains in employment.
Both Fort Worth firms we talked to were in the aircraft industry. Company A is located 
in Fort Worth mainly due to historical accident. The government built a factory in Fort Worth to 
make planes during W WII and sold it to the company after the war. In fact, the government still 
owns the building in which this company is located. Company B is located in Fort Worth 
because it has many good flying days every year.
Houston: The Oil and Gas Technology Capital o f the World
The Houston MSA consists of Chambers, Fort Bend, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery, and 
Waller counties. Total high-tech employment in this metro area accounted for 149,831 in 1993 
with 63,460 in manufacturing and 86,371 in services (see Table 2). Houston has always been
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home to a large variety of oil field equipment manufacturing and service firms. The 
concentration, however, has increased markedly in the past decade because these firms have 
retreated and restructured, closing offices in other cities and consolidating operations in Houston. 
Spurring on this trend has been nearly a decade of low oil and gas prices. Few people can forget 
the heady days of the 1970s and early 1980s, when OPEC controlled the world oil market and 
prices climbed from $3.89 barrel in 1973 to as high as $40 a barrel in 1981. Then came the 
collapse of prices in early 1986, when Saudi Arabia flooded the world with crude oil in order to 
regain market share. Some oil sold for under $10 a barrel. In the ensuing years, oil prices have 
recovered only partially, ranging between an annual average of $ 14 to $20 per barrel. Shocked by 
reduced operating income, oil companies reacted by cutting exploration and drilling activities, 
resulting in the retrenching of the industry. The companies that survived were leaner and most 
opted to concentrate their resources in Houston (Greater Houston Partnership 1995).
High technology represented only 8.6 percent of total employment (see Figure 2) and 34 
percent of manufacturing employment in Houston in 1993 (see Figure 3). High-tech 
manufacturing in the Houston metropolitan area gained 4,988 new jobs between 1989 and 1993 
(see Table 2). Data from Table 3 indicate that the top two high-tech manufacturing sectors in the 
Houston area are Oil and Gas Field Machinery (SIC 3533) and Industrial Organic Chemicals (SIC 
2869). While the first sector lost 2,590 jobs between 1989 and 1993, the second sector gained 
2,017 new jobs during the same period.
High-tech services gained 20,309 new jobs between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2). The 
top two employers in the high-tech service industry were Engineering Services (SIC 8711) and 
Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services (SIC 8721), which showed job gains of 11,099 
and 2,094, respectively, between 1989 and 1993. Computer Programming Services (SIC 7371), 
the fourth largest employer in the high-tech service sector, showed the second largest gain in new 
jobs, 3,902, in the same period (see Table 4).
Of the five companies we interviewed in Houston, two produce Industrial Organic 
Chemicals (SIC 2869), one makes Oil and Gas Field Machinery (SIC 3533), and two produce
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Plastics Materials (SIC 2821). Company A, the second largest producer of oil drilling rigs in the 
world, is located in Houston because that is where most of the oil industry is concentrated. 
Company B is the largest manufacturer of polypropylene in the world, and it is located in 
Houston because that is where the suppliers of its most important raw material, monomers (a 
byproduct of oil refining), are located. Since this raw material is shipped between Company B 
and its suppliers via pipeline, proximity is important. Company C is located in Houston mainly 
because raw materials for the production of pesticides are plentiful and because transportation of 
inputs and final products is easy. Houston is also a good location for the chemical industry 
because of its plentiful water, which is key for chemical plants. Company D makes intermediate 
chemical products, in particular, polyurethane (which is foamed and used in carpets and fiber 
applications) and polyvinyl alcohol. Chemical and especially petrochemical manufacturers, 
Company D ’s most important suppliers, pipeline its main components in. Company E receives 
chemicals from its customers (most of which are chemical firms) and separates them, usually 
through distillation.
San Antonio: An Emerging High-Tech Center
The San Antonio MSA consists of Bexar, Comal, Guadalupe, and Wilson counties. High- 
tech employment accounted for 23,530 jobs in 1993, with 6,898 in manufacturing and 16,632 in 
services (see Table 2). High-tech industries represented 3.6 percent of total employment (see 
Figure 2) and 15 percent of manufacturing employment in 1993 (see Figure 3). High-tech 
manufacturing lost 294 jobs between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2). However, high-technology 
manufacturing is limited in San Antonio; in fact, employment in all of its top five high-tech 
manufacturing sectors combined does not exceed that of the highest sector in any of the other 
Texas metro areas. As observed in Table 2, the major high-tech manufacturing industry in San 
Antonio is Aircraft Production (SIC 3721), which employed 1,750 in 1993, twice as much as the 
next largest, Semiconductors (SIC 3674), which employed 750 people. There were no changes in 
employment in these two sectors between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2). Much of San Antonio’s
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high technology involves medical and biomedical research, which is classified as a service. In fact, 
the largest high-tech sector in this area was Commercial, Physical, and Biological Research (SIC 
8731), which employed 3,047 people in 1993, representing a gain of 1,237 jobs from 1989. 
There was a total gain of 5,962 jobs in the high-tech service sector in San Antonio metro area 
between 1989 and 1993 (see Table 2).
We interviewed two firms in San Antonio, one in the Aircraft (SIC 3721) industry, and 
one that produces Semiconductors (SIC 3674). Company A, which manufactures airplanes, 
located in San Antonio because of its low labor costs and the availability of trained workers (from 
the many U.S. Air Force bases located in the area). Company B, a semiconductor company, 
located in San Antonio because the Austin labor market was already saturated and because there 
was another chip manufacturer already in San Antonio (AMD, now SONY). Additionally, San 
Antonio is a nice place to live.
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Section 4
Empirical Analysis and Econometric Results
In this section we present (1) a description of our original data base of manufacturing 
establishments22 in high-technology industries (2) a general description of the characteristics of 
our sample, and (3) results from our econometric models.
Data
Our original data base of 1,772 establishments in high-technology23 industries came from 
the 1995 edition of the Directory o f Texas Manufacturers (DTM), which is published annually 
by the Bureau of Business Research 24 This original data includes DTM  information on the top 
five 4-digit high-technology SIC codes by both volume of employment and number of firms in 
the five metropolitan areas of Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio (see Table 
5 in Appendix C for a list of the selected SIC codes by metropolitan area).
The empirical part was performed in two phases. During the first phase, conducted in 
the summer of 1996, we interviewed CEOs and managers at 23 high-technology firms in Austin, 
Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio (see Table 6 in Appendix C for a list o f the 
interviewed companies). The companies were carefully selected to comprise a representative 
sample of the population of high-tech companies; thus, we chose companies in different sectors 
and of different sizes. At the end of each interview, we left a questionnaire and a self-addressed 
envelope with the interviewees; we also made a written summary of our conversations with 
them. The purpose of the interview process was twofold. First, we wanted to pre-test early
22 While “ firm” is appropriate in the theoretical section o f this paper, in the empirical section we should strictly be 
speaking about “establishment” instead of “ firm.” According to Audretsch (1995), an establishment can either be 
an independently owned legal entity, in which case it is also an enterprise (firm), or it can belong' to a separate legal 
entity, in which case it is a branch or subsidiary of some enterprise. After warning the reader about this distinction, 
we freely interchange these terms in this section.
23 As previously indicated, we used Markusen et al.’s (1986) selection of high technology SIC codes based on a 
relatively higher proportion o f skilled labor in these SIC codes (see Appendix A).
24 The DTM covers more than 90 percent o f establishments with more than 10 employees in Texas, and more than 
50 percent o f those establishments with fewer than 10 employees. Because we expect to find most innovative high 
tech firms in establishments with at least 10 employees, the DTM is an excellent data base for our study.
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versions of the questionnaire; many changes in the survey instrument were made as a result of 
this pre-test activity. Second, the process helped us formulate and interpret our hypotheses on 
the connection between innovations, networks, and location.
The second phase involved mailing questionnaires to 1,772 high-technology 
establishments25 in the fall of 1996. The target respondent was the CEO (president) or general 
manager. We selected these individuals based on information gathered from the field interviews 
indicating that they would have the broadest knowledge about both customer/supplier 
relationships and about their firm’s new products and processes. Questions were grouped into 
four categories: (1) their most important suppliers, (2) their most important customers; (3) other 
organizations important to them which are neither customers nor suppliers, and (4) location. A 
total of 374 completed questionnaires were returned (21 percent response rate). Responses were 
very close to their proportions in the population of high-tech firms by metropolitan area (see 
Table 7 in Appendix C). Standard research methods were used in an attempt to maximize the 
response rate to the questionnaire survey. We employed the total design method (TDM), a 
technique designed to produce a minimum of 40 percent response rate for mail surveys (Dillman 
1978). This technique has resulted in successful response rates in recent studies on the high- 
technology industry (Lyons 1994). The fundamental element of TDM is a sequence of mailings 
and follow-ups designed to increase response rate. Our survey involved three mailings:
(1) A letter explaining the content and purpose of the survey along with the 
questionnaire and a stamped, addressed return envelope were sent to the 1,772 
sample establishments in November 1996.
(2) 7 days later, a postcard thanking respondents and reminding nonrespondents to 
return questionnaires was sent.
(3) 21 days after the initial mailing, a letter and another copy of the questionnaire 
were sent to all the establishments in our data base.
25 We also sent the questionnaire to 100 Japanese establishments in Texas (see Appendix D), but did not have a 
good response (only 19 answered it), so we did not use this information. We selected these establishments from a 
list o f 200+ Japanese firms in Texas obtained from the Japan External Trade Organization. In 1996, we called each 
firm and found that only 100 of them were manufacturing in Texas (many only have sales offices in the state).
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Although TDM involves a fourth mailing of a letter and replacement questionnaire to 
nonrespondents by certified mail (49 days after the initial mailing), due to time and funding 
restrictions this step was not performed. To further increase the response rate, we were also 
very careful in assuring the confidentiality of firms’ responses; in fact, it was a blind 
questionnaire in which we were not able to identify the respondent. Moreover, in the letter 
accompanying the questionnaire, as an incentive for them to respond, we promised to send 
respondents a summary of the results and a copy of the complete report if they request it.
General Description of our Sample
Most of the 374 manufacturing establishments that responded to our questionnaire were 
small firms—83 percent have fewer than 100 employees and 95 percent have fewer than 500 
employees (the official cut-off point for a firm to be defined as a small firm by the Small 
Business Administration). More striking is the fact that 49 percent of them have fewer than 20 
employees.26 Despite being small, most were independent firms instead of branch plants. Of the 
369 firms that responded to this question, only 16.5 percent indicated that they were branch 
plants. Furthermore, most of them were located in the Houston metropolitan area (40.1 percent), 
followed by the metropolitan areas of Dallas (26.7 percent), Fort Worth (13.9 percent), Austin 
(10.4 percent), and San Antonio (8.8 percent). A relatively high percentage (35.4 percent) of the 
firms started manufacturing in their respective metropolitan area in the 1980s.
As previously mentioned in the subsection on proxies to measure high-technology 
manufacturing, we divided our sample into two groups: those with at least 6 percent engineers 
and scientists in their plant (the high-tech group) and those with less than 6 percent engineers and 
scientists in their plant (the non-high-tech group). We did not observe significant differences 
between the two groups in terms of any of these variables; however, we did find significant 
differences between the two groups in terms of their participation in the international market.
26 Saxenian (1994) reports a similar situation in Silicon Valley, a region populated by close to 3,000 electronic 
manufacturing firms in the 1970s, the vast majority of them small: 70 percent had fewer than 10 employees, and 85 
percent had fewer than 100.
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To account for random changes in firms’ exports,27 we asked: What percentage of your 
plant’s production was exported in the last five years? and What percentage of your plant’s 
revenue came from exports in the last five years '? Most of the firms in our sample do export; in 
fact, only 28 percent do not export. For most of the non-high-tech firms, exports represented a 
relatively small percentage of total production—75 percent of these firms exported less than 10 
percent of their total production in the last five years (see Table 8). On the contrary, as previous 
studies highlight (Hansen and Echeverri-Carroll 1996; Echeverri-Carroll et al. 1997), participation 
in the international market is very important for high-tech firms. About 70 percent of them 
reported that their exports represented more than 10 percent of their total production in the last 
five years. A similar difference between non-high and high-tech firms is observed when we asked 
firms what percentage of their total revenue in the last five years was generated by their exports.
Table 8. Number of sample firms by percentage of total production 
exported in last five years.
0%  (0-10% ) [10-40% ) >40% Total
High tech1 20 34 78 45 177
Non-high tech2 78 51 33 12 174
Total 98 85 111 57 351
1 Defined as firms in which at least 6% o f employees are engineers and scientists.
2 Defined as firms in which less than 6% of employees are engineers and scientists.
The Model and Econometric Results
This subsection describes statistical research on the innovative performance of our sample 
firms. Our main objective is to better understand how a high-technology firm’s innovations (in
27 Firms may export one year but may not export the following year, or they may export a large amount one year 
due to unpredictable circumstances when normally they export only a small percentage o f their total production.
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both product and process) are affected by two factors: (1) the quality of its relationships with 
other firms, mainly with its most important customers and suppliers and (2) the quality and 
access to local sources of knowledge such as technicians from the local area and engineers and 
scientists from local universities or local firms.
We used the basic logit regression model to account for the binary outcome variables 
which indicate innovative performance. Following the general notation of Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(1989), we write the logit model as
In
1 - 7 C . K=0
where the outcome parameters are the natural logarithm (In) of the odds ratio (7i/(l-7t)) of the 
binary outcome Yn, the are observed scores on K independent variables,28 and the 13^ are linear 
regression coefficients. We typically include the constants X0)I1 = ln so that the fl0 is a usual 
intercept term. Each of these indices gives estimates of the independent effects for the predictor 
variables in the model. The parameters of the standard logit model can be interpreted directly or 
after transformation to a probability n(x) :
k { x )  -  -  6
1 + e
where ;r(;e) is the conditional probability that the outcome is present and it is denoted 
byP(K = l|x) = ;r(x) where the vector x’= (xj, x2> x3)..... ,Xk) is a collection of k independent
variables. In the following two subsections, we describe how we tested the capacity of two sets
28 In several cases, we transformed variables which originally had multiple levels into binary dummies. The 
rationale is that respondents are more likely to be able to sort themselves accurately into two groups (those who 
considered a contract longer than one year important or not important, for example) than into five. This procedure 
did not affect the results.
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of variables to predict innovative performance: (1) a set of variables describing the organizational 
structure of the relationship with main customers and suppliers and (2) a set of variables 
describing characteristics of the city (including sources of knowledge spillovers).
Customer/Supplier Networks and Innovations29
Because many companies supply their customers with several different products and buy 
different inputs from suppliers, and because their relationship with customers and suppliers 
differs by product, survey respondents were asked to provide answers regarding only their most 
important customers and suppliers.30 We use Helper’s (1987, 1990, 1991) “voice relationship” 
as a proxy for relationships that are established in a network system. She suggests that a useful 
way to classify a supplier/customer relationship is according to the methods used to resolve 
problems that arise between the parties. In an “exit” relationship, a customer that has a problem 
with a supplier finds a new supplier. In a “voice” relationship, the customer works with the 
original supplier to resolve the problem. Voice relationships have two dimensions: information 
exchange and commitment. As Helper (1991) points out, at the lowest level, the only 
information exchanged is the price of off-the-shelf products; this is the market described in 
economics textbooks, At the highest level, customer and supplier provide continuous feedback 
and suggestions for improvement of each other’s operations; there is a frequent exchange of 
technical information. Commitment refers to the supplier’s degree of certainty that the customer 
will continue to buy its products for some length of time.31 According to Helper (1993), in a 
voice relationship, contracts are: (a) longer than one year, (b) open ended (they can be altered 
when the circumstances change), and (c) involve providing detailed breakdown of process steps.
29 Although we asked questions about the kind of relationships that firms have with other firms which were not 
suppliers or customers (for instance, competitors), we found little evidence that firms in our sample have networking 
relationships with these firms that are significant in their innovations. Thus, the empirical analysis in this section 
focuses only on the relationship with firms which were either customers or suppliers to our sample firms.
30 In the interviews, we found that firms considered their most important suppliers those that supply a high-volume 
or expensive input, or have a monopoly position in the industry. Firms considered their most important customers 
those that are large (they buy in high volume) or strategic (highly visible), or that pay for product development.
31 For instance, if  the supplier experiences a problem with cost or quality, the purchasing firm will attempt to work 
together with the supplier before switching to another supplier.
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We adopted Helper’s voice concept to measure the degree of networking relationships of 
surveyed firms with their main suppliers and customers. Thus, we asked sample firms whether 
their contracts with their main suppliers/customers were for longer than one year and whether 
they were willing to alter the contract if something unexpected occurred (a measure of the 
flexibility of the contract). We did not ask whether suppliers/customers provide detailed 
breakdown of process steps; instead, our interest was in the fi'equency with which technical 
information was mutually exchanged since it has a more direct effect on innovations.32 Firms 
may maintain frequent exchange of information with most of their suppliers/customers, but that 
may be sales and ordering information, not engineering and scientific information. Our questions 
focus on the exchange of engineering and technical information since it is this kind of information 
that would affect innovations.
Innovations and Relationships with Customers
A response that the relationship with most important customers was important in their 
innovations is considered as the key outcome variable in the first logit model. The variable 
termed Ybj is scored as a unit value if the firm answered that the relationship with its most 
important customers was very important in its innovations. Y^ is scored as a 0 if the firm 
answered that this relationship was not important in this function. In measuring the importance 
of the relationship with customers in the innovation performance of a firm, we consider both 
product and process innovations. Thus, the subindex “i” refers to whether this relationship is 
important in (a) the development and commercialization of new products (proxy for product 
innovations) or (b) reducing manufacturing and development cycles (proxy for process 
innovations). Both types of relationships will be affected by the same independent variables. 
We use the following logit regression model:
32 It is important to recognize that the length of the contract does not give any indication o f the volume o f technical 
information exchanged between firms. In fact, many of the largest U.S. auto makers have had arm ’s length 
relationships with the same suppliers for many years, yet each firm knows very little about the manufacturing 
process of the other firm. There is an implicit agreement that as long as the suppliers continue to be the lowest 
bidder, there will be a renewal of the contract next year.
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(1) Pr (Ybi=l) -  F (bpinfo, brinfo, cont, flexc, bloc)
Table 9 presents the description of the dependent- variables and the five explanatory 
variables included in logit model 1. We hypothesize that a firm will be more likely to value the 
relationship with a customer as very important in the task of developing new products or 
processes if the networking between them is strong. A networking relationship involves three 
components. First, it requires frequent (daily/weekly) exchange of technical (engineering and 
scientific) information between firms. Repeat contacts increase knowledge about the partner firm 
(relation-specific expertise) which considerably shortens the lead time necessary for the 
development of new products and processes. Second, networking relationships involve long­
term (longer than one year) contracts. As pointed out by Teece (1981), by establishing long-term 
relationships, firms facilitate the transfer of tacit (experiential) knowledge of the sort frequently 
involved in highly uncertain innovation processes—knowledge which is too difficult for arm’s 
length exchange partners to transfer. Third, networking relationships involve flexible contracts. 
In a market characterized by short product cycles, the ability to change contracts when 
unexpected events occur would play a key role in speeding up innovations.
If networks are more important than arm’s length relationships in high-tech firms’ 
innovations, we would expect that most predictors (coefficients) in logit equation 1 would be 
important and different from zero. Results presented in Table 10 show support for this 
hypothesis. As indicated by the significance of the respective coefficients and the significance of 
the models in columns 1 and 3, high-tech firms are more likely to consider a relationship with a 
customer important in developing new products (proxy for product innovations) or reducing 
manufacturing and development cycles (proxy for process innovations) if the relationship 
involves providing to customers technical information on a daily or weekly basis and maintaining 
flexible, long-term contracts with them. As expressed by CEOs and managers in our interviews, 
customers matter because the firms want to develop only products that can be successfully 
commercialized.
48
Table 9. Description of dependent and independent variables
for logit model 1.
Dependent variables
Y b P is a dichotomous dependent variable with a value o f 1 if  a firm responded that its 
most significant buyers (customers) were veiy important in the process o f 
commercializing and developing new products and with a value o f 0 if  the 
answer was they were not important in this task. The subindex “ i” refers to 
whether it is product or process innovations.
Independent variables
bpinfo buyers provide firm with engineering or technical information daily or 
weekly=T, otherwise=0.
brinfo firm provides buyers with engineering or technical information daily or 
weekly= 1, otherwise=0.
contb firm has a contract longer than one year with most important buyers=l, 
otherwise=0.
flexcb most important buyers were willing to alter contract if unexpected events 
occur=l, othervvise=0.
bloc most important buyers were located in the same metropolitan area=l, 
otherwise =0.
Surprisingly, frequently receiving technical information from its customers does not have 
an important effect on a high-tech firm’s process innovations (see large p-value of variable bpinfo 
in column 3 of Table 10). The effect of this flow of information on product innovations is 
important, but has an unexpected result. The negative, but significant coefficient for bpinfo 
(column 1 of Table 10) indicates that high-technology firms that do not receive frequent technical 
information from their customers have a higher probability of considering a relationship with 
their customer as very important in the process of developing and commercializing new products 
than high-tech firms which receive this information frequently.
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Table 10. Logit results: dependent variable Ybi = importance of buyers in
product and process innovation.
Column I Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
P roduct innovations Process innovations
High tech1 Non-high tech2 High tech1 Non-high tech1
C onstant -2 .099 * -0.965 ** -2 .897 * -1.733
(0.599) (0.559) (0.682) (0.590)
b rin fo 2.338 * 1.148 ** 1.343 * 0.838
(0.801) (0.638) (0.611) (0.598)
b p in fo -2.021 * 0.204 0.069 0.929
(0.840) (0.672) (0.660) (0.639)
contb 1.054 * 1.130 * 1.658 * 0.745
(0.465) (0.451) (0.429) (0.450)
flexcb 2.151 * -0.223 1.548 * 0.679
(0.592) (0.562) (0.651) (0.559)
bloc 0.703 -0.069 0.348 0.478
(0.526) (0.416) (0.512) (0.406)
Sample size 135 123 136 128
-2  log L 38.735 18.587 44.571 25.058
P 0.0001 0.0023 0.0001 0.0001
Note; Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 10 percent level.
1 Defined as firms in which at least 6% o f employees are engineers and scientists.
2 Defined as firms in which less than 6% o f employees are engineers and scientists.
In sum, high-technology firms in Texas show evidence that networking relationships are 
important in their product and process innovations as indicated by the importance of long-term,
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flexible contracts and the engineering and scientific information that they provide to their 
customers. However, these seem to be asymmetric networks in which high-tech firms provide 
more frequently than they receive technical information in developing new products and 
processes (see Figure 4).
Large p-values for the coefficients of variable bloc (columns 1 and 3 in Table 10) indicate 
that the location of the customer does not help explain whether the high-tech firm considers its 
relationship very important in either its product or process innovations. This result is consistent 
with what managers expressed in our interviews: that their most important customers were 
scattered all around and not necessarily concentrated in the same metropolitan area as themselves.
Figure 4. Asymmetric networking relationships with 
customers in product and process innovations.
P roduct innovations
High tech ------------ 5 — ► Main
firm
<
•
customers
Process innovations
a tes>
High tech 
firm
•
Main
customers
Daily/weekly exchange of engineering and scientific information.
^  No daily/weekly exchange of engineering and scientific information. 
U Flexible contracts (willing to alter them if unexpected events occur).
•  Long-term contracts (longer than one year).
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Innovations and Relationships with Suppliers
A response that the relationship with its most important suppliers was important in a 
firm’s innovations is considered as the key outcome variable in the second logit model. The 
variable termed Ysi is scored as a unit value if the firm answered that the relationship with its 
most important suppliers was very important in its innovations. Ysi is scored as a 0 if the firm 
answered that this relationship was not important in this function. In measuring the importance 
of the relationship with suppliers in the innovation performance of a firm, we consider again both 
product and process innovations. Thus, the subindex "i” refers to whether this relationship is 
important in (a) the development and commercialization of new products (proxy for product 
innovations) or (b) reducing manufacturing and development cycles, not necessarily of new 
products (a proxy for process innovations). Both types of relationships will be affected by the 
same independent variables, We use the following logit regression model:
(2) Pr (Ysi= l) = F (spinfo, srmfo, conts, flexes, sloe)
Table 11 presents the description of the dependent variables and 5 explanatory variables 
included in logit model 2 and Table 12 presents results of logit model 2. As indicated by the 
significance of the respective coefficients in column 3 of Table 12, the probability that a high-tech 
firm would value the relationship with a supplier as very important in its process innovations (in 
reducing manufacturing and development cycles) is determined by the flexibility of the contract 
with the supplier and by the technical information that it provides to the supplier. The 
coefficient for the variable sloe shows a large p value, indicating that the location of the supplier 
was not important in explaining whether a high-tech firm considers their relationship as very 
important in its process innovations. This last result is consistent with what was suggested by 
the managers we interviewed: that their most important suppliers were scattered all around.
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Table 11. Description of dependent and independent variables
for logit model 2.
Dependent variables
Y si- is a diehotomous dependent variable with a value o f l  if a firm responded that its
most significant suppliers were very important in trie process o f commercializing 
and developing new products and a value o f 0 if  the answer was negative. The 
subindex “ i” refers to whether it is product or process innovations.
Independent variables
spinfo suppliers provide engineering or technical information to firm daily or 
weekly^ 1, otherwise=0.
srinfo firm provides engineering or technical information to suppliers daily or 
weekly=l, otherwise=0.
conts firm has a contract longer than one year with most important suppliers=l, 
othervvise=0.
flexes most important suppliers willing to alter contract if  unexpected events 
occur=l, othervvise=0.
sloe most important suppliers located in the same metropolitan area=l, 
otherwise=0.
The significant, but negative coefficient for variable sloe (see column 1 in Table 12) 
indicates that the location of the main suppliers matter in product innovations, but it is their low 
concentration in the metropolitan area which is important. This is an indication that in product 
innovations, the relationship with local suppliers is not the only important one. In the 
relationship with suppliers, only the variable flexes, which measures the flexibility of the 
contract, is significant in a high-tech firm’s product and process innovations (see Figure 5).
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Table 12. Logit results: dependent variable YsJ = importance of suppliers in
product and process innovations.
Column I Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
P roduct innovations Process innovations
H igh tech1 Non-high tech2 High tech1 Non-high tech2
C onstant -0 .660 -0.490 -1.497 * -0 .980 *
(0.447) (0.483) (0.511) (0.484)
srin fo 0.779 -1.163 1.102 ** 0.502
(0.569) (0.710) (0.577) (0.566)
sp in fo 0.063 i.778 * 0.081 0.399
(0.605) (0.689) (0.612) (0.554)
conts 0.064 0.074 0.104 0.769
(0.402) (0.482) (0.409) (0.480)
flexes 0.942 ** -0.049 1.609 * 0.510
(0.507) (0.507) (0.554) (0.493)
sloe -0.903 * -0.778 -0.153 0.343
(0.417) (0.497) (0.423) (0.451)
Sample size 133 123 134 123
-2  log L 14.718 11.143 21.917 10.429
P 0.0116 0.0486 0.0005 0.0640
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 10 percent level.
1 Defined as firms in which at least 6% of employees are engineers and scientists.
2 Defined as firms in which less than 6% of employees are engineers and scientists.
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Figure 5. A rm ’s-length relationship with 
suppliers in product and process innovations.
P roduct innovations
^  Daily/weekly exchange of technical information.
^  No daily/weekly exchange o f technical information.
D Flexible contracts (willing to alter them if unexpected events occur).
In sum, the relationship with suppliers in developing new products and processes is more 
characteristic of arm’s length relationships than of network systems as indicated by the fact that 
there is little exchange of technical information with suppliers and a preference for short-term 
contracts with them in developing new products and processes.
Are there Differences Between Non-High-Tech and High-Tech Firms?
Although in the previous subsection we concentrated on the innovative performance of 
high-technology firms (since most innovations should occur within this group of firms), we 
observe some differences between the high-tech and non-high-tech groups in terms of their 
networking relationships with suppliers and customers. Networking relationships with
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customers and suppliers are more important in the innovation of products and processes of high- 
tech than of non-high-tech firms as indicated by the large p-values that most coefficients show in 
the logit regression for the non-high-tech firm group (see columns 2 and 4 in Tables 10 and 12). 
We also observed some similarities between the two groups. Both high- and non-high-tech firms, 
for instance, show similar locational patterns for their most important suppliers and customers: 
they tend to be scattered all around instead of concentrated in a particular metropolitan area (see 
Table 13).
Table 13. Location of most important suppliers and customers.
Suppliers Custom ers
Concentrated in 
the metro area
Scattered Concentrated in 
all around the metro area
Number o f firms
Scattered 
all around
H igh-tech firms 49 119 33 137
Non-high-tech
firm s 51
110 63 97
T otal 100 229 96 234
As policymakers struggle to attract high-tech firms (because of the expected implications 
for innovations and economic growth), the issue of what benefits from the urban area can 
uniquely attract or encourage the development of high-tech firms becomes relevant. Table 14 
shows that the quality of life is the most important consideration for the performance of high- 
tech firms (average response of 3.69), but it is also the most important consideration for the 
performance of non-high-tech firms (average response of 3.56). Similarly, central location for 
product distribution to other areas is an important consideration for high-tech firms (average 
response of 3.10); however, it is also an important consideration for non-high-tech firms (average 
response of 3.31). In fact, t-tests reject the hypothesis that there are differences between the 
means for these two groups in these two variables at the 0.05 level.
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Table 14. For high-tech and non-high-tech firms, mean responses on 
importance of “urban characteristics” on performance of firms.
n  Non-high (ech High tech Pro >  |Tj
Foci for majority of your sales/purchases 353 3.19 2.60 0.0000
Centra! location for product distribution 
to other areas 36! 3.31 3.10 0.1357
Accessibility to frequent flights for your 
employees 344 2.24 2.67 0.0735
Presence of other firms that help you 
attract skilled labor 354 2.73 3.02 0.0245
Establishments supplying temporary help 360 2.08 2.42 0.0085
Other specialized business services 357 2.63 2.86 0.0763
Information from local universities’ 
scientists and professors 355 2.06 2.32 0.0404
Local universities provide engineers and 
scientists 357 1.94 2.36 0.0006
Local firms are a source of 
scientists/engineers 353 2.09 2.58 0.0001
Local area is a source of technical 
personnel 356 2.69 3.17 0.0002
Quality of life of the local area 353 3.56 3.69 0.2391
The urban factors that are unique to high-tech firms are (a) the presence of other high-tech 
firms to attract skilled labor and (b) the availability of local technical personnel. In fact, t-tests 
do not reject the hypothesis that there are differences between the means for these two groups in 
these two variables at the 0.05 level. The uniqueness of these urban factors is consistent with the 
opinion of the managers and CEOs that we interviewed, who maintain that the presence of other 
high-tech firms is important not so much as a direct source of engineers and scientists, but 
because of their indirect effect of reducing the likelihood that a skilled worker will suffer a long 
bout of unemployment. All the high-tech firm interviewees said they look for expertise, in 
particular for engineers and scientists, wherever it is available and are not necessarily constrained
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in this by geographical barriers. On the contrary, most of them said that they hire most of their 
technical personnel locally. In fact, most concerns of high-tech firms in the Austin metro area, 
where high-tech employment has grown rapidly in the 1990s, are based on the scarcity of local 
technical personnel (see Kay 1996),
Not all high-tech firms conduct research and development which leads to innovations. 
Some of them assemble high-tech products whose R&D was conducted at headquarters located 
elsewhere. Because economic development benefits perceived from high-tech firms are mainly 
associated with the implicit assumption that they are highly innovative activities, we must ask 
whether innovative high-technology firms tend to rely mainly on local sources of knowledge.
Does Geogt'aphy Matter for Innovative High-Technology Firms?
It makes sense to assume that firms which establish long-term networking relationships 
that involve a continuous exchange of engineering and scientific (technical) information with 
suppliers and customers may gain a competitive advantage by locating close to them. Besides 
delivering products faster, they can establish more frequent communication between 
manufacturing facilities, and, as already indicated, frequent communication over a long period of 
time would have a positive effect on innovations by allowing the development of relation-specific 
expertise (knowledge). To measure the effect of spatial proximity on innovations, one has first 
to recognize that most of the knowledge is neither located inside a company nor readily available 
for purchase (Powell et al. 1996). Knowledge is embodied in people who communicate 
informally and in this process exchange “free” ideas. A critical issue in assessing the relationship 
between innovations and knowledge externalities is that this informal exchange of knowledge is 
difficult to measure. However, following Arrow (1962) and Krugman (1991a), we believe that 
while it is not possible to directly measure the extent to which this informal exchange of ideas 
occurs, it is possible to identify the main sources of knowledge for firms. We make the crucial 
assumption that knowledge is more important and embodied, at least to some degree, in skilled 
labor: engineers, scientists, professors, and technicians.
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We ask two critical questions. (J) Which organizations are a source o f  skilled labor fo r  
high-technology firms? We agree with the NSF (1996) study that networking relationships with 
customers and suppliers is perhaps the most important source of knowledge for innovations; 
however, we also test the importance of other sources of skilled labor, such as other high- 
technology firms, universities, and business services. (2) Are these organizations located mainly 
in the same metropolitan area where the high-tech firm is? A body of literature suggests that the 
most important sources of knowledge are local; thus, high-tech firms hire engineers and scientists 
mainly from local firms and universities and technical personnel from local technical institutes. 
This argument is based on the assumption that knowledge (as opposed to information) is 
expensive to transfer across long distances (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Under this 
assumption, the networking of firms within a city becomes the primary source of knowledge for 
innovations. This is the scenario described by Saxenian (1994) in Silicon Valley, where most 
strategic relationships between high-tech firms are local and where the intensity of these local 
networks gives these firms the ability to come out with a constant stream of new products.
A second body of literature suggests that the main sources of knowledge for innovations 
are not concentrated in the same city in which the high-tech firm is located. Krugman (1991) 
suggests that innovative firms may agglomerate for reasons other than the availability of 
knowledge sources, such as the quality of life or availability of major inputs (which are also the 
reasons why non-high-tech firms agglomerate). The fact that most important suppliers and 
customers for high-tech firms in our sample are scattered all around certainly supports the view 
that at least knowledge created in the relationship with these firms is not local. Previous 
empirical studies for high-tech firms in Texas also suggest that some high-tech firms’ most 
strategic relationships are not established with local firms (Hansen and Echeverri-Carroll 1997).
To test whether the main sources of knowledge for innovations are local or not, we divide 
our sample of high-technology firms33 into two groups: (a) high-tech firms which are innovating 
faster than their industry group, and (b) high-tech firms that are innovating at a slower pace than
33 A firm which answered that 6 or more percent o f its employees were engineers and scientists.
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their industry group. Our models are built with the objective of examining the influence of two 
factors, (a) characteristics of cities and (b) relationships with main customers/suppliers, on the 
probability that a high-tech firm innovates (in products and processes) at a pace above its 
industry group average. These effects on innovations in high-tech firms are estimated separately 
for product and process innovations. Equation 3 estimates the probability that a high-tech firm 
will develop and bring to market new products faster than firms in its industry group. The 
variable termed Ypl is scored as a unit if the firm answered that it was above its industry group 
average when comparing the average number of products it developed and brought to market with 
that of its industry group in the last two years. YpJ is scored as a 0 if  the answer was that it was 
below its industry group average. The probability that a high-tech firm will be above its industry 
average in product innovations is estimated by the following logit regression model:
(3) Pr (Ypj=l) = F (organizational + locational variables)
Table 15 presents a description of the predictor variables included in logit model 3. 
According to Marshall (1920), a city offers a firm benefits associated with three kinds of 
variables: (1) technological spillovers, (2) a pooled market of workers with specialized skills, and
(3) availability of specialized inputs and services. Krugman (1991) mentions a fourth reason, 
suggested much earlier by Weber (1929) and Isard (1956): the size of the market and easy 
transportation and distribution of products. Thus, we asked firms in our sample to evaluate the 
relative importance of these urban characteristics in the performance of their plant on a scale from 
1 (not important) to 5 (very important). In running the logit regression, we transformed these 
variables which originally had multiple levels into binary dummies with a value of 1 (very 
important) if the response was either 4 or 5 and a value of 0 (not important) if the response was 
either 1, 2, or 3.
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Table 15. Independent variables: organizational and locational variables.
Organizational Variables_________________________________________________________________
(1) bprodin: it has a value of 1 if  a firm responded that its relationship with buyers was
important in developing and commercializing new products and a value o f 0 
otherwise.
(2) sprodin: it has value o f 1 if  a firm responded that its relationship with suppliers was
important in developing and commercializing new products and a value o f 0 
otherwise.
(3) bproccin: it has a value of 1 if  a firm responded that its relationship with buyers was
important in reducing manufacturing and development cycles (proxy for process 
innovations) and a value ofO otherwise.
(4) sprocein: it has a value o f 1 if  a firm responded that its relationship with suppliers was
important in reducing manufacturing and development cycles (proxy for process 
innovations) and a value ofO otherwise.
Locational Variables*____________________________________________________________________
a. Scale o f the city
(5) foci for the majority o f a firm’s saies/purchases (MKS)
(6) the presence of other specialized business services (SBS)
(7) establishment supplying temporary help (ETH)
(8) quality of life (QL)
b. Transportation
(9) a central location for the distribution o f products (CLD)
c. "Local” technical externalities
(10) presence o f other firms help you attract skilled labor (POF)
(11) information from local universities’ scientists and professors (ILU)
(12) local universities provide engineers and scientists (LUE)
(13) local firms are a source o f  scientists and engineers (LFS)
(14) local area is a source oftechnical personnel (LAT)
d  “Non-local" technical externalities
(15) accessibility to frequent flights for your employees (AFF)
* The original question asked firms to evaluate, on a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very inportant), 
the contribution ofthe metropolitan area in which they were located to the performance of their plant. 
In the logit regression model, however, we transfcrmthese multilevel variables to binary ones. These 
independent variables have a value of! ifthe answer was either 4 or 5 and a value ofO otherwise.
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If Krugman’s (1991) view is right, we expect to find that the probability for a high-tech 
firm to develop new products at a pace above its industry group is related not to the city as a 
locus of knowledge, but to the city as a locus of communication with other metropolitan areas 
where external sources of knowledge are located. On the contrary, evidence to support 
Audretsch and Feldman’s (1996) hypothesis will be found if local sources of knowledge are the 
most important factor in determining whether a high-tech firm develops and commercializes new 
products at a pace faster or slower than the average in its industry group.
Our results, presented in Table 16, support the first hypothesis. As indicated by the 
significance of the coefficients and of model 3 (the most parsimonious model of the three that we 
estimated), a high-tech firm will have a higher probability of developing new products at a pace 
faster than the average for its industry group if (a) it maintains close relationships with suppliers 
in developing new products (variable named sprodin), (b) it maximizes access to external (non­
local) sources of knowledge by locating in a city that provides frequent flights for its employees 
(variable named AFF), and (c) it maximizes access to technical personnel (a source of knowledge) 
by hiring some of them from outside the area (variable named LAT).
Equation 4 estimates the probability that a high-tech firm will reduce manufacturing and 
development cycles (a proxy for process innovations) faster than firms in its industry group. 
The variable termed Ypr is scored as a unit if the firm answered that it was above its industry 
group average when comparing the average changes it has made to reduce its manufacturing and 
development cycles with those that firms in its industry group have made. Ypr is scored as a 0 if 
the high-tech firm answered that it was below its industry group average. The probability that a 
high-tech firm will be above its industry average in process innovations is estimated by the 
following logit regression model:
(4) Pr (Ypf-1) -  F (organizational + locational variables)
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Table 16. Logit model results: dependent variable Ypi.
Column ! Column 2 Column 3 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
V ariables Bk Bk Bk
Intercept 1.353 * 
(0.557)
0.899
(0.618)
0.585
(0.425)
Organizational variables
bprodin 0.170 0.163
(0.589) (0.554)
sprodin 0.978 1.038 **
(0.664) (0.580)
"Local" variables
Sales/purchases (MKS) -1 .090 -0.994
(0.679) (0.695)
Product distribution (CLD) 0.314 0.277
(0.671) (0.701)
Other firms (POF) 0.844 0.439
(0.799) (0.884)
Temporary help firms (ETH) 1.479 1.567
(1.010) (1.018)
Business services (SBS) 0.942 0.611
(0.674) (0.732)
Local professors/scientists (ILU) -0.022 -0.012
(0.926) (0.955)
Universities provide engineers (LUE) -0.484 -0.424
(1.006) (1.122)
Engineers from local firms (LFS) 0.073 0.127
(0.859) (0.901)
Local technicians (LAT) -1.300 ** -1 .457  ** -1 .402  *
(0.704) (0.756) (0.605)
Quality o f life (QL) -0.806 -0.625
(0.6647) (0.696)
“External" variables
Frequent flights (AFF) 1.560 ** 
(0.929)
1.519
(0.995)
1.797 * 
(0.790)
n
-2  log-L  
P
91
21.050
0.0329
86
22.105
0.0538
86
14.786
0.0052
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 0.05 percent level. ** Significant at the 0.10 percent level.
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Table 17. Logit model results: dependent variable Ypr,
Column / Column 2 Column 3
Model 1 M odel 2 M odel 3
V ariables Bk Bk Bk
Intercept 0.784 -0.105 0.646 **
(0.547) (0.683) (0.372)
Organizational variables
bproccin 0.276
(0.962)
sproccin 2.560 * 1.968 *
(1.091) (0.704)
“Local” variables
Sales/purchases (MKS) -0.556 -0.147
(0.820) (0.856)
Product distribution (CLD) 0.672 0.216
(0.849) (0.920)
Other firms (POF) 1.202 1.404
(1.191) (1.170)
Temporary help firms (ETH) -0.243 -0.614
(1.271) (1.473)
Business services (SBS) 1.463 . 0.928
(1.132) (1.340)
Local professors/scientists (ILU) -0.746 0.013
(1.016) (1.109)
Universities provide engineers (LUE) 0.583 -0.591
(1.314) (1.597)
Engineers from local firms (LFS) "1.986 -2.277
(1.597) (1.763)
Local technicians (LAT) -0.160 -0.041
(0.953) (1.060)
Quality o f life (QL) 0.587 0.737
(0.689) (0.803)
“External” variables
Frequent flights (AFF) 0.894 0.220
(1.086) (1.096)
n 79 75 76
-2  log-L 9.519 18.388 9.526
P 0.5741 0.1433 0.0020
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 0.05 percent level. ** Significant at the 0.10 percent level.
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As indicated in Table 17 by the significance of the coefficients and model 3 (the most 
parsimonious model of the three that we estimated), the sources of knowledge for process 
innovations are strongly associated with one source: the involvement of suppliers in process 
innovation (sproccin), Thus, a high-tech firm has a higher probability to be above its industry 
group average in process innovations if it maintains a significant relationship with suppliers in 
this task.34
34 Institutional factors other than customer/supplier relationships and access to knowledge from the sources we have 
considered here are often important in determining innovations. For example, the volume of internal research and 
development and the length of time in which the finn has been doing R&D are important determinants cf 
innovations (Jaffe et al. 1993). We account for these effects indirectly, in the sense that internal R&D is strongly 
correlated with skilled labor in the factory (Grillinches et al. 1997). Thus, we expect that firms with a high 
proportion o f skilled labor will have high correlations with other variables affecting innovations, such as R&D.
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Section 5 
Conclusions
High-technology studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s implied that the United 
States was developing a dual manufacturing economy with a spatial division of labor between 
regions: research and development in the Northeast and West and production plants in the 
Sunbelt states (Norton and Rees 1979; Malecki 1979, 1980a,b,c). Studies conducted at the 
Bureau of Business Research in the 1980s and published under the series title Technology in 
Texas cautioned policymakers that such a trend would cast into doubt the possibility that high- 
technology industries locating in Texas could generate dynamic economic growth (Campbell 
1986; Campbell and Goodman 1986).
Is the high-technology industry locating in the region innovating or simply assembling 
high-tech products? How can a region develop or attract innovative high-technology firms? In 
designing policies to develop or attract innovative high-technology firms, policymakers must 
understand the factors that affect innovations. We argue that Japanese-style networks could 
positively affect the innovative performance of firms in industries (such as high technology) that 
are marked by changing demand conditions for two reasons: (1) knowledge networks create 
“network-specific expertise,” which speeds up product and process innovations (Aoki 199n), 
and (2) spatial proximity, usually assumed for Japanese networked firms, could facilitate the 
exchange of tacit information, a key input in innovations.
In studying the relationship between Japanese-style networks and innovations in high- 
technology firms, we considered conceptual issues. First was the issue of defining a high- 
technology industry. After reviewing strengths and weaknesses associated with different 
classifying criteria, we opted for Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier’s (1986) high-technology 
definition, which is based on the percentage of “human capital” jobs in an industry. (Human 
capital jobs include engineers, technicians, scientists, mathematicians, or some combination
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thereof.) Using this criterion, Markusen et al. (1986) selected 100 4-digit industries listed as high 
technology.
This definition offers several competitive advantages. In particular, human skills highly 
correlate with other indicators of “technological” performance, such as R&D (Berman et al. 
1994), the stock of capital, information intensity, and, most important for our study, innovations 
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996). In fact, human capital is associated with positive effects on 
economic development at the national (Romer 1986) and regional (Glaeser 1994, Lucas 1988, 
Rauch 1991, Krugman 1991) levels because of its positive impact on innovations.
Using Markusen et al.’s (1986) industry classification, we compared trends in high- 
technology employment by industry in the “traditional” U.S. high-technology regions—Silicon 
Valley, Route 128, Southern California, and Research Triangle Park (RTP)—and in Texas 
between 1989 and 1993. In Texas, we studied the high-tech industry in the metropolitan areas of 
Austin, Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, and Dallas. To determine employment trends in 
high-technology services, we used Vinson and Harrington’s (1979, cited by Markusen et al. 
1986) list of high-technology industry service-related SIC codes, as determined by product 
sophistication. We used employment data from County Business Patterns, the only employment 
data available by detailed SIC industrial classification at the county level. Data show job gains in 
the high-technology service industries in all of the considered high-tech regions between 1989 and 
1993. However, job gains in manufacturing were experienced only by the high-tech industries in 
RTP, Houston, and Austin. Despite the importance usually attributed to the high-tech sector in 
these regions, the degree of economic diversification of these regions is significant: the 
participation of high tech in total employment in any of the regions considered in this analysis 
never exceeds 15 percent.
High-tech employment in both manufacturing and services in the five largest metropolitan 
areas in Texas was 435,512 in 1993. Houston has the largest participation with 149,831 high- 
tech jobs; closely followed by Dallas, 145,454; then Fort Worth, 63,027; Austin, 53,670; and 
finally San Antonio, 23,530. Each metropolitan area tends to specialize in certain high-tech
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manufacturing sectors—aircraft production in Dallas, Fort Worth, and San Antonio; 
telecommunications in Dallas; semiconductors and computers in Austin; and oil and gas 
technology in Houston—and in certain high-tech services, with Austin and Houston specializing 
in engineering services, Dallas in computer and data processing services, Fort Worth in accounting 
services, and San Antonio in biotechnology research. This analysis indicates that the Texas high- 
tech industry is now a major player in the U.S. high-tech sector. This observation, together with 
Markusen et al.’s (1986) finding that the high-technology industry is highly innovative, makes 
Texas an excellent case to study innovations in high-tech firms.
Specialized Supplier Networks as a Source of Innovative Advantage
What kind of industrial organization will be more conducive to innovations? That will be 
determined by the type of market. For firms competing in markets characterized by short 
product cycles, a network industrial organization, such as the one associated with the Japanese 
firm, introduces new products faster than an arm’s length organization (Aoki 199n). The success 
of Japanese firms in rapidly developing new products is often attributed to their ability to 
coordinate design and manufacturing effectively with suppliers (Aoki 19n, Helper 199n; Dyer 
199n). By involving suppliers early in product innovation, Japanese firms avoid the waste 
characterized by mismatches in the fitting of parts within a new product (Womack et al 199n). 
Supplier engineers and customer engineers develop relation-specific know-how and have 
substantial experience working together; hence, they are less likely to misread blueprints or 
misinterpret information (Nishiguchi 1994; Clark 1989; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Westney and 
Sakakibara 1986; Stalk and Hout 1990; Helper 1991).
The ability to develop new products rapidly is an important source of competitive 
advantages in many firms, not only Japanese ones. We contend that competitive advantages 
from supplier networks could be particularly important in high-technology firms that compete 
by rapid introduction of differentiating, high value-added products.
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In studying innovations in firms35 rather than industries, we encountered the problem that 
only some firms within each “high-tech SIC code” may be high tech. Thus, we asked 
establishments in our sample (374 establishments) what percentage of their labor force was 
represented by engineers and scientists. Using this information, we classified each firm within a 
high-tech SIC sector: those in which at least 6 percent of their total employees are engineers and 
scientists we called high-tech firms (135 establishments), and those with a proportion of 
engineers and scientists less than 6 percent we called non-high-tech firms (128 establishments). 
In doing this, we follow Markusen et al. (1986), who found that the national average of the 
proportion of engineers, engineering technicians, computer scientists, life scientists, and 
mathematicians to total workforce for all industries was 5.82 percent.
We hypothesized that a high-technology firm, in the process of developing new products 
and processes, establishes relationships with three types of firms: suppliers, customers, and 
competitors.36 We adopted Helper’s (1987,1989) definition of “voice relationships” as a proxy 
for network (versus arm’s length) relationships and assumed that three aspects of network 
systems can affect firms’ innovations: (1) frequency of technical (engineering and scientific, as 
opposed to sales and ordering) information exchange, (2) length of contracts, and (3) flexibility of 
contracts.
On the positive side, results from our logit models indicate that high-technology firms in 
Texas are significantly more likely to perceive the relationship with customers as important in 
developing new products (proxy for product innovations) or reducing manufacturing and 
development cycles (proxy for process innovations) if the degree of networking with customers 
is high. A high degree of networking means firms and customers exchange knowledge (scientific 
and engineering information) daily or weekly and have flexible, long-term contracts. However, 
these networks seem to be asymmetric—that is, in developing new products and processes, high-
35 We used interchangeably the terms firm and establishment although as we acknowledged previously the economic 
theory distinguishes between them.
36 We found that relationships with other firms (competitors) were not important for firms in the innovation 
performance of firms in our sample. Similar results were found in a pilot study on the U.S. high technology industry 
(NSF 1996).
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tech firms provide technical information more frequently than they receive it (see Figure 4 on 
page 47).
On the negative side, firms’ relationships with suppliers in developing new products and 
processes is more characteristic of arm’s length relationships. High-tech firms and suppliers 
exchange little technical information. Also, these firms prefer short-term contracts with suppliers 
when developing new products and processes. Only the importance of the flexibility of the 
contract in innovations emulates a component of network relationships (see figure 5 on page 51). 
The little support for supplier networks as an explanatory variable in the innovative performance 
of high-technology firms in Texas aligns with Helper’s (1989) findings on the relationship 
between U.S. automakers and their suppliers. In that study, automakers showed more of a desire 
to transfer inventory costs to suppliers than to establish partner relationships. Our results, 
however, seem surprising given the abundance of examples of the positive effects for innovations 
of close relationships with suppliers, not only for Japanese firms but also for high-technology 
firms in Silicon Valley.
According to Saxenian (1994), computer firms in Silicon Valley redefined relations with 
their most important suppliers during the 1980s. Recognizing that their success was inextricably 
tied to that of their suppliers, these firms began treating the suppliers as partners in a joint 
process of designing, developing, and manufacturing innovative systems. These collaborative 
relationships allowed both customer and supplier to become more specialized and technologically 
advanced. A network of long-term partnerships with specialist suppliers also gave computer 
companies a formidable competitive advantage that was difficult for competitors to replicate.
Supplier networks, then, promote technological advance. In Saxenian’s (1994) view, 
collaboration in a network system encourages joint problem solving between system firms and 
their suppliers. In the example of Silicon Valley, firms learned to respond collectively to fast- 
changing markets and technology.
Do suppliers tend to locate in the same metropolitan area as the high-technology firm? 
Saxenian (1994) reports that Silicon Valley-based computer manufacturers often preferred local
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suppliers, particularly for technologically complex or customized parts. This preference for 
geographical proximity was not reducible to costs considerations. She argues (p. 157) that “most 
saw the advantages of timely delivery but also recognized that it was difficult to create over long 
distances the trust and teamwork needed for collaborative supplier relations.”
However, the Silicon Valley locational patterns seem to differ from those of the high- 
technology industry in Texas, where most of the main suppliers tend to be scattered rather than 
concentrated in the same metropolitan area as the high-technology firms. For instance, 71 
percent of high-technology firms in our sample indicated that their main suppliers were dispersed 
rather than centralized in their same metropolitan area. Moreover, when asked to rank from 1 to 
5 the importance of several factors in the performance of their firms (with 1 being not important 
and 5 being very important), the group of high-tech firms in our sample assigned a relatively low 
average valuation (2.60) to their individual metropolitan areas as an important locus for the 
majority of their sales/purchases. Thus, although some Texas high-technology firms may be 
located in the same city as their suppliers, most are global firms with their most important 
suppliers (and customers) dispersed around the world.
In sum, high-tech firms* relationships with suppliers and customers can be an important 
source of knowledge for innovations, but these suppliers and customers are scattered all around, 
not concentrated in one metropolitan area. We questioned the firms in our survey regarding other 
possible sources of local knowledge relevant for innovations in order to understand the reasons 
why high tech-firms agglomerate.
How Can a Region Attract High- Instead of Non-High-Technology Firms?
The positive relationship between local knowledge spillovers and innovations is based on 
the assumption that firms cannot appropriate all the knowledge they generate. Part of the 
knowledge “spills over” and is appropriated by other firms that do not pay for it. The 
importance of knowledge spillovers for innovations, however, extends beyond the relationship 
between “legal agents” (i.e., those between firms) to include relationships established between
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educated people who just happen to live in the same city. In this context, an urban area can be an 
important locus for communication between a firm’s skilled labor and the skilled labor in local 
universities, technical institutes, and other local high-tech firms—even when a high-tech firm does 
not have a formal agreement with any of these legal agents.
In fact, most studies of the high-technology industry maintain that the innovative 
capacity of high-technology firms depends on knowledge externalities emerging from the informal 
local relationships of their executives and engineers. Thus, the studies identify local knowledge 
spillovers as an important component of this industry where growth has not taken the form of 
large physical plants, but instead has developed through the accumulation of local intellectual 
capital. As Angel (1995) suggests, much technological knowledge in the high-technology 
industry is tacit, embedded in the skills and experiences of workers and local institutions and not 
easily transferable across national and regional boundaries.
We recognize that while it is not possible to directly measure the extent to which 
knowledge externalities exist, it is possible to identify main sources of knowledge externalities for 
firms. The crucial assumption we make here is that knowledge spillovers are more important and 
embodied, at least to some degree, in skilled labor, in particular, engineers, scientists, and 
technicians. Firms can obtain skilled labor essentially from three main sources: universities, 
technical institutes, and other firms (beside suppliers and customers). Thus, we question the 
importance of these local sources of technical information in the performance of high-technology 
firms.
In our sample, the average response evaluation for local universities as a source of 
engineers and scientists was 2.36, indicating that most high-technology firms give little valuation 
to the availability of engineers and scientists from local universities as a main determinant of their 
performance. Firms do not limit themselves to local universities when hiring engineers and 
scientists; on the contrary, they hire most of their engineers and scientists from the most 
prestigious universities in the United States. Interviewees told us that they look for expertise
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wherever it is available.37 The role that universities can play in the innovative performance of 
local firms is more complex. In this regard, Saxenian (1994) maintains that differences in the 
relationships of MIT and Stanford with their respective local firms explain the differences in the 
industrial systems in Silicon Valley and Route 128. MIT’s relations with established large 
corporations reinforced a tendency toward arm’s length relations and excluded most small and 
medium-sized companies38 Stanford, in contrast, offered an important advantage to small 
companies that sought to attract top talent but were unable to provide the continuing education 
and training needed in a fast-changing technological environment39 Future research should focus 
on the kinds of relationships that Texas universities should maintain with high-technology firms 
and on which kinds are more conducive to innovations.
Other local firms can also be an important source of engineers and scientists. However, 
the high-technology firms in our sample gave little valuation to this factor (average of 2.58) in 
their performance. Firms do not limit themselves to hiring engineers and scientists from the 
locality; on the contrary, most are hired from other high-technology regions. In fact, perhaps the 
most significant job difference between Silicon Valley and Austin is the lack of job-shifting by 
engineers and middle managers in Austin (Solid State Technology 1994). Angel (1995), for 
instance, notes that semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley fill the majority of job vacancies from 
within the local labor market, drawing on the large pool of specialized labor skills within the 
region. In his view, one consequence of this interfirm mobility is that firms in the region have the 
opportunity to recruit workers with experience from the local labor market, thereby avoiding the 
need to develop requisite skills and experience in-house (e.g., through internal training programs).
37 Similar results were found in a recent study based on interviews with 24 high tech firms in Austin (Oden 1997).
38 Over time, some of the Route 128 region’s large firms themselves began to offer employees training and 
education. This posed an obvious problem for small and medium-sized firms, which could not afford the cost of 
training programs.
39 It opened its classrooms to local companies through the Honors Cooperative Program and encouraged engineers 
at electronics companies to enroll in graduate courses directly or through a specialized televised instructional 
network that brought Stanford courses into company classrooms. The Stanford Industrial Affiliates Program 
facilitates direct interaction between the university and firms of all sizes.
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Unlike the situation for engineers and scientists, technical personnel are hired mainly 
locally. In fact, the average valuation for the local area as a source of technical personnel was 
3.17 for high-technology firms, This local factor received the second highest valuation in the 
performance of high-tech firms in our sample, after quality of life (3.69). Technicians tend to be 
less mobile, and the fixed costs of recruiting technicians outside the local area will be a large 
percentage of the wages paid to them.40 Shortage of skilled labor is often cited as an important 
constraint on future growth in the high-technology sector; however, because of the difficulty of 
moving technicians, a tight local labor market usually means a short supply of technicians. 
Samsung in Austin, for instance, is offering cash incentives to recruit mostly technicians and 
operators (Oden 1997).
Local knowledge can also come from a direct relationship with scientists and professors in 
a local university. However, its importance was given only a 2.58 average score, indicating that 
this kind of local knowledge is not a significant determinant in the performance of high- 
technology firms. This is consistent with other findings in the literature. For instance, Jaffe 
(1989) finds little support for the hypothesis that biotechnology firms tend to rely more on local 
scientists. The lack of geographical barriers in the relationship between R&D and the 
performance of high-tech firms is not surprising considering that large funding for industry­
relevant research comes from the federal government and benefits the U.S. high-tech industry, not 
just the high-technology firms located in that city. For instance, the impact of research 
conducted at SEMATECH and MCI transcends the geographical boundaries of their Austin 
locations to benefit the U.S. semiconductor industry against Japanese competition (see Gibson 
and Rogers 1994 for a good account of these institutions).
Krugman (1991) poses an important question: Do high-technology firms concentrate 
because most of the knowledge relevant for their innovations is obtained from the local area, or do 
they locate in a city for the same reasons that non-high-tech firms locate there? Our findings that 
most sources of knowledge for innovations in Texas high-technology firms are obtained from
40 Similar results were found in a recent study based on interviews with 24 high tech firms in Austin (Oden 1997).
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outside the metropolitan area (only technicians are hired mainly from the local area) indicates that 
local knowledge spillovers are not the raison d’etre for high-technology firms to agglomerate. 
This evidence supports Krugman’s (1991) hypothesis that innovative firms may agglomerate for 
other reasons, such as the quality of life or availability of major inputs, which are also the reasons 
why non-high-tech firms agglomerate.
We argue that the reasons why high-technology firms agglomerate are economies of 
specialization associated with the size of the economic activities within a city. In essence, a large 
city becomes a magnet for skilled labor. The concentration of a large number of high-tech firms 
becomes an indirect source of attraction for engineers and scientists who expect to hop from one 
high-tech firm to another. The presence of a large university also acts as a magnet for attracting 
skilled labor. Continuing higher education in a major university is an important factor in an 
engineer’s decision to move to a high tech region. A large university also attracts large research 
projects—such as SEMATECH and MCI—that serve to enhance the capacity of the city to 
draw skilled labor. Thus, agglomeration economies play a significant role in facilitating the 
migration of skilled labor to the city.
However, we disagree with Krugman’s (1991) view that high- and non-high-tech firms 
may locate for similar reasons. Results from our survey indicate that high-tech firms seem to 
depend more on technical personnel; non-high-tech firms, on the local market. Thus, while the 
presence of good technical institutions may be a decisive factor in a high-tech firm’s decision to 
locate in a specific city, a large pool of customers and suppliers may be more important to a non- 
high-tech firm. Moreover, although factors such as quality of life and good infrastructure 
consistently list among the important determinants in high-tech firm location decisions, we find 
that these factors are equally important for non-high-tech firms. If policymakers want to attract 
only high-tech firms, they should focus their efforts on providing good technical personnel and 
developing economies of scale by attracting other high-tech firms and supporting a large 
university.
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Not all high-tech firms conduct research and development that leads to innovations. Some 
only assemble the products resulting from R&D conducted at headquarters located in a different 
state. Because the economic development benefits perceived from high-technology firms are 
mainly associated with the implicit assumption that they are highly innovative activities, we 
asked which “urban” attributes are exclusive to innovative high-technology firms.
How Can a City Attract Innovative High-Technology Firms?
Saxenian (1994) believes that firms’ organizational structures and their relationships to 
their respective regions help explain the differences in their innovative performance. She 
attributes the innovative success of high-tech firms in Silicon Valley to their regional network 
systems that are based on a surprising degree of cooperation—almost Japanese in its closeness— 
among companies. Local networks are widely recognized as an important factor not only in the 
innovative success of a firm (Porter 1990; Audretsch and Feldman 1996), but also in their ability 
to penetrate foreign markets, independently of their size.41
In contrast, there is little research on the importance of external networks in the 
innovation performance of firms. Our study represents a contribution in this direction. We 
imply from this analysis that external linkages of skilled labor play a key role in expanding access 
to knowledge, and therefore, these linkages have a positive effect on firms’ innovations. We find 
significant evidence of the importance of external knowledge networks in the innovative 
performance of high-tech firms:
(a) As already indicated, most high-technology firms in our sample give little valuation to 
their relationship with suppliers in their product/process innovations. However, 
those high-technology firms that recognize the significance of their relationship with 
suppliers (which are mainly scattered all around) are developing new products and
41 Much of this work has built upon the experience of “the Third Italy” and the role that formal and informal 
production networks have played in that region’s growth. Similar industrial clusters have been identified in other 
parts o f Europe— for example, Germany’s Baden-Wurttemberg region, Denmark’s Jutland region, and Mediterranean 
France.
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processes faster than their competitors, as anticipated by the theory and empirical 
studies on Silicon Valley.
(b) Texas high-technology firms that maximize access to external (non-local) sources of 
knowledge by locating in cities that provide frequent flights for their employees are 
more likely to develop new products faster than their competitors. Accessibility 
variables also proved to be very important in Markusen et al.’s (1986) pioneering 
study of the U.S. high-technology industry, both in terms of internal mobility 
(freeway density) and, more important, in terms of airport access. In fact, they 
suggest that the business travel aspect of airports may be more important than air 
cargo services in attracting high-tech companies.
(c) Texas high-technology firms that maximize access to external (non-local) sources of 
knowledge by hiring some technical personnel from outside the city are also more 
likely to develop new products faster than the competition.
Although we agree that independent firm-based industrial systems respond more slowly 
than network-based systems to changing markets and technologies, our evidence does not 
support the view that the most strategic relationships are essentially local. There seem to be 
complementarities between local and external relationships, and, in fact, both are strategic in the 
development of new products and processes. A firm learns from other firms, which explains 
why it establishes networking relationships with other firms (including its most important 
customers and suppliers). These relationships, however, are not constrained by geographical 
boundaries. As firms expand their knowledge based on the process of developing more 
technologically sophisticated products, the demand for interaction of all sorts (internal and 
external) should increase. At the same time, the role of cities as centers of both internal and 
external interaction should also expand.
The view that gives “exclusive” importance to local knowledge spillovers in innovations 
is based on the argument that relatively close proximity of companies and skilled individuals 
makes association not only easier (Saxenian 1994), but also less costly (Krugman 1991). Spatial
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proximity facilitates occupational mobility (individuals move both within and between sectors) 
and informal exchange of information. In particular, when knowledge (as opposed to 
information) is costly to transfer, spatial proximity become a necessary condition for innovations 
to take place (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). If knowledge is expensive to transfer across long 
distances, one would assume that innovative firms’ most strategic relationships—in particular 
those with potential sources of knowledge, such as main suppliers/customers, universities, and 
technical institutions—would be mainly local. Our results indicate that knowledge may be more 
expensive to transfer than information, but it may also provide companies with more benefits 
than information, especially in terms of the positive effects that it has on innovations. In this 
context, companies may have an incentive to look for knowledge outside the city.
Summary of the Main Findings
• Although factors such as quality of life and good infrastructure have been consistently 
found to be important determinants in the location of high-tech firms, we find that 
these factors are equally important for non-high-tech firms. If policymakers want to 
attract only high-tech firms, they should focus their efforts on providing good 
technical personnel, attracting other high-tech firms, and supporting a large university.
These last two factors are important in attracting skilled labor.
• If the objective is to attract high-tech firms active in innovations, policymakers should 
focus on providing not only the right local technical personnel, but also the 
infrastructure that allows frequent communication with other areas high in sources of 
knowledge. Such infrastructure is necessary because knowledge is widely distributed, 
and therefore the locus of innovations is found in both local and external relationships.
• A key issue in the growth of R&D in Texas is the quality, location, and convenience 
of commercial airline service that facilitates frequent communication between local 
high-technology firms and their suppliers, their customers, and universities that 
specialize in their particular needs, all of which are mainly located outside the area.
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• Also important to the growth of R&D in Texas is the availability of technical 
personnel locally or information on the availability of technical personnel outside the 
region.
• Organizational arrangements, such as network systems, that provide access to 
knowledge quickly and reliably produce competitive advantages in the innovation 
performance of high-technology firms. These competitive advantages, however, are 
not affected by the locational patterns of network firms.42
• Competitive advantages in terms of firms’ innovation performance are associated with 
networking relationships with both customers and suppliers. Our results indicate that 
most high-tech firms in Texas overlook an important strategy in developing new 
products faster than competitors: establishing networking relationships with 
suppliers.
• Local universities can maintain cooperative relationships with local high-technology 
firms by (1) creating programs at the university that facilitate direct interaction with 
local firms and (2) getting high-tech firms to commit to financing and supporting these 
programs. One important step in this direction would be the creation of a high 
technology program  at the University of Texas at Austin. The program would 
emulate MIT’s Automobile Vehicle Program, but would focus on the high-technology 
industry in Texas. It would be a joint initiative between the College of Business 
Administration and the College of Engineering to help Texas high-technology firms (in 
particular, small and medium-sized ones) develop specialized supplier networks as a 
source of innovative advantage. Funding for the program would come from Texas 
high-technology firms and perhaps the Higher Education Coordinating Board.
42 It is important to indicate that even the assumed spatial proximity that characterized Japanese automobile firms in 
Japan and the United States has been questioned by the dispersed geographical patterns shown by Japanese 
automobile firms in Europe (Saddler 1992; Echeverri-Carroll 1994).
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Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier (1986) list 100 industries as high tech, based on the percentage of 
engineers, engineering technicians, computer scientists, life scientists, and mathematicians in the 
industry labor force. The national average for all industries is 5.82%. Industries are defined as 
high tech if the industry average exceeds 5.82%. Based on this classification scheme, 30 sectors 
(3-digit SIC) are classified as high tech. The data used to create this definition is disaggregated to 
the 3-digit level only. Within these sectors are 100 4-digit industries, as listed below. This is the 
database used by Markusen, Hall, and Glasmeier. NEC means* “not elsewhere classified.”
Table 1. 100 4-digit SIC codes defined as high-technology manufacturing industries.43
Industry name (1972 SIC codes) 1972 SIC 1987 SIC
alkalies & chlorine 2812 2812
industrial gases 2813 2813
inorganic pigments 2816 2816
industrial inorganic chemicals, NEC 2819 2819
plastic materials, synthetic resins 2821 2821
synthetic rubber 2822 2822
cellulosic man-made fibers 2823 2823
synthetic organic fibers, except cellulose 2824 2824
biological products 2831 2835, 283644
medical, chemical, botanical products 2833 2833
pharmaceutical preparations 2834 2834
soap, other detergents 2841 2841
special cleaning, polishing preparations 2842 2842
surface active finishing agents 2843 2843
perfumes, cosmetics, toilet preparations 2844 2844
paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels 2851 2851
gum, wood chemicals 2861 2861
cyclic crudes, intermediates, dyes 2865 2865
industrial organic chemicals, NEC 2869 2869
nitrogenous fertilizers 2873 2873
phosphatic fertilizers 2874 2874
fertilizers, mixing only 2875 2875
pesticides, agricultural chemicals, NEC 2879 2879
adhesives, sealants 2891 2891
43 In converting 1972 SIC codes to 1987 SIC codes, in cases where parts o f one 1972 SIC code become included in 
more than one 1987 industry group, we only counted it once.
44 1972 SIC code 2831 was split Into 1987 SIC codes 2835 (in vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances) and 2836 
(biological products, except diagnostic substances).
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explosives 2892 2892
printing ink 2893 2893
carbon black 2895 2895
chemicals, chemical preparations, NEC 2899 2899
petroleum refining 2911 2911
reclaimed rubber 3031 306945
small arms ammunition 3482 3482
ammunition, except small arms, NEC 3483 3483
small arms 3484 3484
ordnance, accessories, NEC 3489 3489
steam, gas, hydraulic turbines 3511 3511
internal combustion engines, NEC 3519 3519
construction machine equipment 3531 3531
mining machinery equipment 3532 3532
oilfield machinery equipment 3533 3533
elevators, moving stairways 3534 3534
conveyors, conveying equipment 3535 3535
hoists, industrial cranes, monorail systems 3536 3536
industrial trucks, tractors, trailers, stackers 3537 3537
machine tools, metal cutting types 3541 3541
machine tools, metal forming types 3542 3542
specialty dies, die sets, jig  fixtures, industry molds 3544 3544
machine tool accessories, measuring devices 3545 3545
power-driven hand tools 3546 3546
rolling mill machinery equipment 3547 3547, 354846
metalworking machinery, NEC 3549 3549
pumps, pumping equipment 3561 3561
ball, roller bearings 3562 3562
air, gas compressors 3563 3563
blowers, exhaust, ventilation fans 3564 3564
industrial patterns 3565 3543
speed changers, industrial high drives, gears 3566 3566
industrial process furnaces, ovens 3567 3567
mechanical power transmission equipment, NEC 3568 3568
general industrial machinery equipment, NEC 3569 3565, 3569, 359'
^  1972 SIC code 3031 (reclaimed rubber) became 1987 SIC code 3069 (fabricated rubber products, NEC)
^  Additional 1987 SIC code: 3548 (electric and gas welding and soldering equipment).
^  1972 SIC code 3569 was split into 1987 SIC codes 3594 (fluid power pumps and motors), 3565 (packaging machinery), 
and 3569 (general industrial machinery, NEC).
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electronic computing equipment 3573 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 369548
calculating acctg. mach., except electrical computer equip. 3574 3578
scales, balances, except laboratory 3576 3596
office machinery, NEC 3579 3579
power, distribution special transformers 3612 3612
switch gear, switchboard apparatus 3613 3613
motors, generators 3621 3621
industrial controls 3622 3625
welding apparatus, electric 3623 3548
carbon, graphite products 3624 3624
electrical industrial apparatus, NEC 3629 3629
radio, TV receiving sets, except communication types 3651 365149
phono records, pre-recorded magnetic tape 3652 3652
telephone, telegraph apparatus 3661 3575, 366150
radio, TV transmitting, signal, detection equipment 3662 3661, 3663, 3669, 3699, 3812, 
382951
cathode ray tubes, NEC 3671, 3672, 
3673
367152
semiconductors, related devices 3674 3674
electronic capacitators 3675 3675
resistors for electronic applications 3676 3676
resistors, electric apparatus 3677 3677
connectors, electronic applications 3678 3678
electronic components, NEC 3679 3679
aircraft 3721 3721
aircraft engines, parts 3724 3724
aircraft parts, auxiliary equipment, NEC 3728 3728
railroad equipment 3743 3743
48 1972 SIC code 3573 was split into 1987 SIC codes 3571 (electronic computers), 3572 (computer storage 
d e v i c e s ) , q f 3 5 7 5  (computer terminals), 3577 (computer peripheral equipment, NEC), and 3695 (magnetic and 
optical recording media).
49 SIC code 3651 was renamed in 1987: household audio and video equipment.
50 1972 SIC code 3661 became part of\9%l SIC 3575 (computer terminals) and part o f  SIC 3661 (telephone and 
telegraph apparatus).
51 1972 SIC code 3662 was split into the following 1987 SIC codes: part o f  3661 (telephone and telegraph 
apparatus), 3663 (radio and TV communications equipment), 3669 (communications equipment, NEC), part o f  
3699 (electrical equipment and supplies, NEC), p a r/ of 3812 (search and navigation equipment), and part o f  3829 
(measuring and controlling devices, NEC).
52 1972 SIC codes 3671 (electron tubes, receiving type), 3672 (cathode ray tubes, NEC), and 3673 (electron tubes, 
transmitting) became 1987 SIC code 3671 (electron tubes).
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guided missiles, space vehicles 3761 3761
guided missiles, space vehicles, propulsion units 3764 3764
guided missiles, space vehicles, parts, NEC 3769 3769
tanks, tank components 3795 3795
engineering, laboratory, scientific, research instruments 3811 3812, 3821, 3826, 382953
indus. controls for communic. and environmental applic. 3822 3822
industrial instruments for measurement and display 3823 3823
fluid meters, counting devices 3824 3824
instruments, measuring, testing, electrical, electrical signals 3825 3825
measuring, controlling devices, NEC 3829 3829
optical instruments, lenses 3832 382754
surgical, medical instruments apparatus 3841 3841
orthopedic, prosthetic, surgical applications 3842 3842
dental equipment, supplies 3843 384355
photographic equipment, supplies 3861 3861
53 1972 SIC code 3811 was split into the following 1987 SIC codes: part o f  3812 (search and navigation 
equipment), 3821 (laboratory apparatus and furniture), part o f  3826 (analytical instruments), part o f  3829 
(measuring and controlling devices, NEC).
54 1972 SIC 3832 was split into the following 1987 SIC codes: part o f  3826 (analytical instruments), SIC 3827 
(optical instruments and lenses),and part o/'3829 (measuring and controlling devices, NEC).
We also included 1987 SIC codes 3844 (X-ray apparatus and tubes and related irradiation apparatus) and 3845 
(electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus).
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County Business Patterns (CBP) data is a mid-March snapshot of full and part-time 
employment from payrolls. It does not include self-employed proprietors or much of the 
government sector and therefore cannot be used to determine total employment.
Of the regions we selected, all correspond to MSA divisions except Southern 
California/Los Angeles and Route 128. Therefore, county level data is required to determine total 
employment coinciding with our defined regions. It is also necessary that the data be collected on 
an annual basis so that information from 1989 and 1993, specifically, can be extracted.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) were 
considered for the current task, There is no reason to look for smaller or more obscure sources 
for statistics as comprehensive as total employment by county for the entire United States. We 
have to look at well known sources. BLS is organized by state only, not by MSA, so it will not 
serve our purposes. BEA is organized annually, by county, MSA, and state (but not by SIC 
code); it distinguishes proprietors from employees, government from non-government, and farm 
from non-farm employment. BEA statistics are employment figures averaged over a twelve­
month period.
We concluded that the best approach to calculating total (non-farm) employment is to use 
the sum of CBP county totals with BEA county government employment totals and then 
aggregate these to the regions we specified. Both sources look at payroll information, but BEA 
and CBP are not wholly compatible for the following reasons: (1) BEA is an annual average and 
CBP is a mid-March snapshot, and (2) CBP does not include unsalaried proprietors and BEA 
does; this would not affect the government sector but does affect employment totals. Some spot 
calculations by county and MSA comparing CBP and BEA total employment figures show a 
consistent discrepancy on the order of 10 percent between the two sources. But calculations 
comparing the ratio of CBP manufacturing to CBP total employment plus BEA government 
employment with the ratio of BEA manufacturing employment to BEA total employment are 
roughly comparable (+/- 1%). We concluded that given the CBP data already in hand, the best
1 0 0
approach is to calculate total employment as the sum of CBP total employment with BEA 
government employment.
These results from our model are complemented by other information we got from non- 
high-tech firms in our sample. In fact, of 170 high-tech firms that responded to the question of 
whether their main customers were located in the same metropolitan area as themselves or 
scattered all around, 80 percent (137 firms) responded that their most important customers were 
located all around. These results are consistent with what was said by the managers we 
interviewed: that in relatively few instances are the most important customers located in the 
same metropolitan area as the partner firm. For instance, only 60 percent (97 firms) of the non- 
high-tech firms (versus 80 percent of the high-tech firms) that responded to the question of 
whether their main customers where located in the same metropolitan area as themselves or 
scattered all around say that their most important customers were scattered all around. Non­
high-tech firms also tend to have suppliers scattered all around. Of 161 non-high-tech firms that 
responded to the question of whether their main suppliers were located in the same metropolitan 
area as themselves or scattered all around, 68 percent (110 firms) responded that their main 
suppliers were scattered all around. In fact, of 168 high-tech firms that responded to the question 
of whether their main suppliers were located in the same metropolitan area as themselves or 
scattered all around, 71 percent (119 firms) responded that their most important suppliers were 
located all around.
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Table 3. Total employment by region for top five 
high-technology manufacturing SIC codes.
SIC Em ploym ent
Area code Industry  nam e 1989 1993 C hange
M ASSACHUSETTS
3679* Electronic Components
i l l l i l i l l
6,938
W m m i  ■ - -. _■ 
9,267
||1 tip
3674 Semiconductors 9,134 8,589 -545
3841* Surgical and Medical Instruments 5,270 7,355 2,085
3724 Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts 9,250 6,531 -2,719
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Equipment 8,569 5,981 -2,588
357 l f Electronic Computers 20,014 5,235 -14,779
376 V Missiles and Space Vehicles 7,500 3,750 -3,750
CALIFORNIA
1 ■ • .
3721
Southern Calitorj
v : , ; .  ’ \  ' • :
Aircraft
u V  ■' . 'V  •
79,390 ~ 50,601 28^789 ^
3728 Aircraft Parts 51,718 37,542 -14,176
3761 Missiles and Space Vehicles 67,175 34,089 -33,086
3679 Electronic Components 19,786 18,967 -819
3674* Semiconductors 14,497 12,842. -1,655
3571f Electronic Computers 14,555 6,005 -8,550
3674 Semiconductors 41,353 34,291 -7,062
3571 Electronic Computers 31,703 22,206 -9,497
376! Missiles and Space Vehicles 37,500 17,500 -20,000
3679 Electronic Components 17,231 17,337 106
3661* Telephone and Telegraph Equipment 7,415 9,945 2,530
3671* Electron Tubes 9,555 1,507 -8,048
NORTH CAROLINA
3571* Electronic Computers
rnmmsm
195 18,250
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Equipment 7,500 5,234 -2,266
2834* Pharmaceutical Preparations 1,135 1,935 800
3841* Surgical and Medical Instruments 870 1,870 1,000
3625 Relays and Industrial Controls 1,560 1,750 190
3825f Instruments for Measuring Electricity 1,945 1,135 -810
3629f Electrical Industrial Apparatus 1,750 375 -1,375
3679* Electronic Components 1,403 10 -1,393
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TEXAS
Austin. i ' : - .  v_--i - ;-r7
... •. '• '
. .
3679 Electronic Components 7,735 12,270 4,535
3674 Semiconductors 7,675 9,531 1,856
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 1,925 1,925 0
3571 Electronic Computers 2,841 1,760 -1,081
3842* Orthopedic and Surgical Supplies 750 1,750 1,000
3728f Aircraft Parts 1,750 175 -1,575
Dallas
3728 Aircraft Parts
3674 Semiconductors
3661* Telephone and Telegraph Equipment
3679 Electronic Components
3721 Aircraft
3761* Missiles and Space Vehicles
17,350
9,845
2,125
4,262
3,942
3,750
SiiBSi
:
7,640 -9,710
9,935 90
6,310 4,185
4,204 -58
4,500 558
0 -3,750
• •
: - •
....  .
3721 Aircraft 37,510 17,510 -20,000
3728 Aircraft Parts 1,043 7,114 6,071
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 1,810 3,750 1,940
3674* Semiconductors 750 1,750 1,000
3579 Office Machines 750 1,750 1,000
3069* Fabricated Rubber 1,760 983 -777
3661* Telephone and Telegraph Equipment 1,750 750 -1,000
'
3533 Oil and Gas Field Mach. and Equipment 10,928 8,338 -2,590
2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals 7,995 10,012 2,017
2821 Plastics Materials 4,890 6,483 1,593
3571 Electronic Computers 7,510 2,684 -4,826
2879* Pesticides and Agricultural Chemicals 1,812 1,647 -165
3511* Steam, Gas and Turbine Generators 1,750 3,750 2,000
■ ' -^-
0 ......
3721 Aircraft 1,750 1,750 0
3674 Semiconductors 750 750 0
3661* Telephone and Telegraph Equipment 235 435 200
3569 General Industrial Machinery 375 375 0
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 435 375 -60
3724* Aircraft Engines 175 375 200
3841* Surgical and Medical Instruments 375 279 -96
3571* Electronic Computers 375 175 -200
3625* Relays and Industrial Controls 375 175 -200
*Top five in 1993 only. *Top five in 1989 only.
Source: Data extracted from County Business Patterns CD ROM records 1989-1990 and 1992-1993.
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Table 4. Total employment by region for top five high-technology service SIC codes. 
S i c  Em ploym ent
Area code Industry  nam e 1989 1993 Change
MASSACHUSETTS
m m im s m
■ f i i i S p i l
87 U Engineering Services 19,791 16,891 -2,900
7372 Prepackaged Software 8,422 13,822 5,400
7371 Computer Programming Services 6,981 10,564 3,583
8731 Commercial Physical and Biological Research 15,362 9,878 -5,484
7374* Computer Processing and Data Preparation Services 5,029 8,874 3,845
872 V Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 6,671 4,934 -1,737
CALIFORNIA
• . . . . -  . ’ 7  • ;!
8721 Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 60,885 63,992 3,107
8711 Engineering Services 52,330 51,356 -974
8741 Management Services 29,458 36,729 7,271
7371 Computer Programming Services 20,136 19,160 -976
8742 Management Consulting Services 
■ . Silicon Valley •
19,903
-//■'-j:. :  ^ :
•
'
17,040
• . -
-2,863
'v: ; -- ■■'-1 v '■ " V-S
7372* Prepackaged Software 8,037 24,715 16,678
8711 Engineering Services 26,826 22,793 -4,033
7371 Computer Programming Services 13,861 15,215 1,354
8721 Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 14,193 12,727 -1,466
8731 Commercial Physical and Biological Research 10,512 10,568 56
8742f Management Consulting Services 8,847 8,631 -216
NORTH CAROLINA
•• • . : .
8711 Engineering Services 2,578 3,218 640
8731 Commercial Physical and Biological Research 2,091 2,419 328
7373* Computer Integrated Systems Design 620 2,306 1,686
7371* Computer Programming Services 1,198 2,283 1,085
8721 Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 1,655 1,990 335
7372* Prepackaged Software 1,907 1,605 -302
874 l f Management Services 1,230 1,647 417
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TEXAS
‘
8711 
8741 
7373* 
7371*
8721 
873 l f 
8742*
' . ' ■; .v
Engineering Services
Management Services
Computer Integrated Systems Design
Computer Programming Services
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services
Commercial Physical and Biological Research
'
7374 
8741 
8721 
8711 
8742* 
737 1*
8721 
8711
8741
8742 
7375*
■. • •
5,211 5,493 282
1,207 2,302 1,095
166 2,118 1,952
600 1,562 962
1,326 1,441 115
1,562 1,089 -473
1,137 2,302 1,165
Computer Processing and Data Prep. Services 
Management Services
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 
Engineering Services 
Management Consulting Services 
Computer Programming Services
14,708
7,564
8,490
6,879
3,740
3,803
16,075
12,332
9,234
5,985
5,809
5,332
; . ' 
1,367 
4,768 
744 
-894 
2,069 
1,529
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 
Engineering Services 
Management Services 
Management Consulting Services 
Information Retrieval Services
7371
; • •• , ....... ..
‘ •
2,949
1,796
3,025
976
10
604
2,063
1,932
1,825
1,184
750
365
-886
136
■1,200
208
740
-239
8711 
8721 
8741 
7371* 
7374 
8742*
illii  
8731
8721
8711
8741
8742*
7374*
Engineering Services
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 
Management Services 
Computer Programming Services 
Computer Processing and Data Prep. Services
Management Consulting Sem ces
•v. •. .: •
21,376 
8,265 
6,983 
3,390 
4,143 
4,800
1 0  •
Commercial Physical and Biological Research 1,810
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services 1,975
Engineering Services 1,312
Management Services 1,041
Management Consulting Services 450
Computer Processing and Data Preparation Services 696
..
32,475 
10,359 
8,763 
7,292 
3,879 
3,499
11,099
2,094
1,780
3,902
-264
-1,301
3,047 1,237
2,830 855
2,189 877
1,515 474
1,295 845
861 165
*Top five in 1993 only. *Top five in 1989 only.
Source: Data extracted from County Business Patterns CD ROM records 1989-1990 and 1992-1993.
107
Table 5, Main high-technology manufacturing industries 
in five major Texas metropolitan areas.
Includes top five high-tech 4-digit SIC codes by volume o f employment and top five by number offirms.
Austin
3544 Special Dies and Tools, Die Sets, Jigs and 
Fixtures, and Industrial Molds
3571 Electronic Computers
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
3679 Electronic Components, NEC 3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices
3823 Industrial Instruments for Measurement and 
Related Products
3842 Orthopedic, Prosthetic, and Surgical 
Appliances and Supplies
Fort Worth
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment, 
NEC
3544 Special Dies and Tools, Die Sets, Jigs and 
Fixtures, and Industrial Molds
3533 Oil and Gas Field Machinery, Equip. 2899 Chemicals and Chemical Preps., NEC
3535 Conveyors and Conveying Equipment 3721 Aircraft
3679 Electronic Components, NEC 2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
3069 Fabricated Rubber Products, NEC 3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices
Dallas
3544 Special Dies and Tools, Die Sets, Jigs and 
Fixtures, and Industrial Molds
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment, 
NEC
3679 Electronic Components, NEC 3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices
3721 Aircraft 3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus
3823 Industrial Instruments for Measurement and 
Related Products
2842 Specialty Cleaning, Polishing, and 
Sanitation Preparations
2899 Chemicals and Chemical Preps., NEC
Houston
3533 Oil and Gas Field Machinery and 
Equipment
3511 Steam, Gas, and Hydraulic Turbines, and 
Turbine Generator Set Units
3823 Industrial Instruments for Measurement and 
Related Products
2821 Plastics Materials, Synthetic Resins, and 
Nonvulcanizable Elastomers
2899 Chemicals and Chemical Preps., NEC 2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals, NEC
3561 Pumps and Pumping Equipment 3571 Eiectronic Computers
3569 Gen. Indus. Machinery, Equip., NEC
San Antonio
3728 Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment, 
NEC
3537 Industrial Trucks, Tractors, Trailers, and 
Stackers
3544 Special Dies and Tools, Die Sets, Jigs and 
Fixtures, and Industrial Molds
2842 Specialty Cleaning, Polishing, and 
Sanitation Preparations
3679 Electronic Components, NEC 3721 Aircraft
2899 Chemicals and Chemical Preps., NEC 3531 Construction Machinery and Equip.
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations
NEC= Not Elsewhere Classified
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Table 6. List of interviews.
We interviewed each person on this list at least once during the summer of 1996. Individuals are identified here 
with the company or organization they worked for at the time of the initial interview, but with the high levels of 
mobility in the industry, it is expected that some have moved since that time.
Houston
1. Pyram id: Louis M. Wells, Vice President Engineering
2. M ontell Polyolefins: C.J. LeBlanc, Plant Manager
3. SK  Biosciences Corp.: Frank Cristi
4. A ir P roducts and Chemicals, Inc.: Bob Martien, Manager of Environmental Affairs
5. H alterm ann  Inc.: Simon Upfi 11-Brown, President and CEO
Austin
1. 3M  C orporation : Robin Pollock
2. Advanced M icro Devices: Kevin E. Picco, Senior Product Marketing Engineering
3. Applied M aterials: Erwin Carroll, Genera! Manager
4. C rystal Sem iconductors: Nav Sooch
5. Dell C om puters: George Huntington
6. Ross Technology: Trevor S. Smith, Vice President o f Product Design
7. N ational Instrum ents: Jhon Lay, Manager, Engineering Process and Support
8. M otorola: Claude Moughanni, Manager
9. DTM  C orporation : Michae! Ervin, Vice President, Engineering, Development and Manufacturing
10. VLSI Technology: Khalil Shalish
Fort Worth
1. Bell H elicopter Textron: Lawrence E. Frase, Business Planning Manager
2. Lockheed M artin  Tactical A ircraft Systems: William Bullock, Executive Vice President
Dallas
I. Decibel P roducts: Peter Milandt, President
2. N orthern  Telecom: Graham P. Strange, Vice-President Network Marketing
3. R F  M onolithics, Inc.: Sam L. Densmore
4. Texas Instrum ents: George A. Consolver, Director, TI Strategy Process
San Antonio
1. V LSI Technology: Dick Watson, Equipment Engineering
2. Fairchild  O perations: Herbert K Langthorp, Vice-President Operations
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Table 7. Number of high-technology manufacturing establishments.
DTM 1 Percentage Sam ple2 Percentage
A ustin 342 7.6 39 10.4
Dallas 1,371 30.7 100 26.7
F ort W orth 630 14.1 52 13.9
H ouston 1,827 40.9 150 40.1
San A ntonio 295 6.6 33 8.8
T otal 4,465 100 374 100
1 DTM = Directory of Texas Manufacturers, 1995 edition. Based on Markusen et al.’s (1986) 
100 4-digit high tech SIC codes (see Table 1).
: Based on 5 top high tech 4-digit SIC codes in each metro area by number of firms and volume 
of employment (see Table 4).
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Appendix D
Japanese Manufacturing Establishments in Texas
i n
Aromat Corporation
Mr. Ken Ptaff
850 East Arapano Road
Richardson TX 75081----
214/235-0415
AERA Corporation
8601 Crosspark Drive 3100
Austin TX 78754----
512/339-7100
Action Stainless, Inc 
Mr. Hal Oxspring 
6922 La Paso
Houston YX 77087----
713/640-2823
America Taisho Electric Corporation 
Mr. Takumu Osao
1200 Golden Key Circle Suite 300
El Paso TX 79925----
915/595-3697
Anelva Engineering Corporation 
Suite 199 800 East Campbell Road
Richardson TX 75081----
214/437-4671
Awaji USA, Inc 
Mr. Eiji Mio
Suite 300 east, 4801 Woodway Drive
Houston TX 77056----
713/439-0333
Canon U. S. A., Inc,
Mr. Doug Johnson 
3200 Regent Boulvard
Irving TX 75063----
214/830-9600
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co.
Site 550. 6100 Western Place
Fort Worth TX 76107----
210/423-6540
Chusei U.S.A. Inc. 
12500 Bay Area Blvd.
Pasadena TX 77507--
713/474-6540
Cryco Quartz Inc. 
8107 Altoga Dr. 
Austin TX 78724—  
512/926-8931
Kobelco America, inc
10515 Harwin Drive Suite 139A
Houston TX 77036----
713/981-4050
AVX Corporation 
Mr. Matt Vogel
Suite 807, 1701 Greenville Avenue
Richardson, TX 75081----
214/669-1233
Allied Apical Co.,Inc.
Mr. Takeoka
6161 Underwood Road
Pasadena TX 77507----
713/474-1879
American Yazaki Corporation 
Mr. Keith Daubt 
12 Leighfisher
El Psao TX 79906----
915/778-5373
Arai North America
Suite 460,12801 North Central Expressw
Dalis TX 77002----
713/654-7101
Calsak Corporation 
Mr. Hal everton 
6819 rulton St.
Houston TX 77022----
713/699-0501
Cantex.Inc.
2101 S. E. let St. P.O. Box 76
Mineral Well TX 76068----
817/235-3344
Chickasha cotton Oil Co. 
P. 0. Box 532379
Harlingen TX 78553----
10/423-6540
Colin Medical Instruments Corp. 
5850 Farinom Drive.
San Antonio TX 78249----
210/690-8800
Dianal America Inc. 
9675 Bayport Blvd. 
Pasadena TX 77507—  
713/474-7777
Disco High Tech America
Mr. Garg Harris
900 East Park, Suite 150
Plano TX 75074----
214/423-4798
Ebara Intemationl Corporation
Mr. Clyde Marks
Suite 344 4545 Pinetimbers
Houston TX, 77041----
713/820-7850
Electroluminescent Technologies Co. 
5524 Bee Caves Road Building M
Austin TX 78746----
212/327-9801
Eval Conpany of America 
11500 Bay area Blvd..
Pasadena TX 77507----
713/474-9111
Firestone Synthetic Rubber i Latex
Mr. Colien Riengle
P. 0. Box 1269.1006 Farm road
Orange TX 77630----
409/883-1776
Fujinon inc
Mr. Dave Waddell
2001 Midway Road 1114
Carrollton TA 75006----
214/385-8902
Fujitsu-ICL System Inc.
Mr. Rod Powell
5400 LBJ Freeway, 3450
Dallas TX 75240---
214/982-8400
Global Octanes Texas L. P 
Mr. James, K. Cole 
2621 Tidal Road
Deer Park TX 77536----
713/478-4086
Gould Inc.
Mr. Jerry Doon Hecker
2410 Highway 281 N. P.O. Box 729
Marble Falls TX 78654----
210/693-3522
Hosokawa Micron Internationl, Inc 
6110 South 42nd Avenue
McAllen TX 78503----
512/682-4557
E. K. Fasteners, Inc 
Mr. Ken Lawson
Suite 100, 4300 Pinetimbers Lane
Houston TX 77041----
713/462-2100
Elcom. Inc.
20 Butterfield Trail
El Paso TX 79906---
915/779-0077
Epson America
Suite 2029/ 1950 Stemmons Freeway
Dallas TX 75207----
214/746-3260
Fanuc USA Corporation 
Mr, Jimmy Shintani 
1010 Richcrest Drive
Houston TX 77060----
713/876-3530
Fujikoki America. Inc 
Mr. Geoge Lambert 
4040 Bronze Way
Dallas TX 75237----
214/333-4266
Fujitsu Network Systems. Inc. 
Mr. Inoue
2801 Telecom Pkwy..
Richardson TX 75082----
214/690-6000
Geo Space Corporation
Mr. Ohya
7334 N. Gessner
Houston TX 77040----
713/939-9700
Glory (USA), Inc,
Mr. Joe Collins
Suite 103, 1600 North 1-35 East
Carrollton TX 75006----
214/323-0411
Hitachi Semiconductor/ Inc.
6431 Longhorn Dr.
Irving TX 75063-2738 
214/518-1501
INX International Ink Co. 
Mr. David Corona 
85 Oates Road #2
Houston TX 77013----
713/672-5670
ISK Biotec Corp.
2239 Haden Rd., 
Houston TX 77015----
K-Bin Inc.
Mr. Danis Dodgen 
5616 Highway 332 East
Freeport TX 77541----
409/233-6610
Kaneka Texas Corporation 
6161 Underwood Road
Pasadena TX 77507----
713/474-7084
Kimmon Quartz Ltd.
Mr. Takashi Hirosawa 
5757 N. Riverside Drive
Fort Worth TX 76137----
817/232-3995
Konica Business Machines USA/ Inc 
24 Greenway 800
Houston TX 77046----
713/871-9392
Kuraray America 
Mr. Tomida
11500 Bay Area Boulevard
Pasadena TX 77507----
713/474-9111
Master-Halco, Inc.,
Mr. Tim Taner
8008 C. F. Hawn Freeway
Dallas TX 75217----
214/391-1126
Maxroy Corporation
1360 Post Oak Blvd. Suite 1590
Houston TX 77056----
713/621-5579
Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift
Mr. Tetsu Okuno
2011 W. Sam. Houston Pkwy.N.
Houston TX 77043-2421
713/467-12-34
NTN bearing Corporation of America 
2200 Century Circle
Irving TX 75062----
214/721-0110
Iwatsu America, Inc.
Mr. Davis Carissimi 
8722 Royal Lane
Irving TX 75063--*—
214/929-0242
Kanda Telecom Inc 
Suite R, 1807 Braker Lane
Austin TX 78758----
512/453-8562
Kikkorran Intemationl, Inc 
Suite 205, 1440 W. Mokingbird Lane
Dallas TX 75247----
214/516-4207
Kohl & Madden Printing Ink Corp. 
8900 Premier Row,
Dallas TX 75247----
214/638-5560
Konica Business Machines USA, Inc,
Mr. Lorita Boyd
Suite 300, 12900 Senlac Drive
Dallas TX 75234----
214/247-2471
Lame3a Cotton Oil Mill 
P. 0. Box 421
Lamesa TX 79331----
806/872-2166
Matheson Gas Paroductsd. Inc,
P. 0. Box 969.1290 West Fairmont Parkw
La Porte TX 77572----
713/471-2544
Mistui Petrochemicals
Mr. Yutaka Haneda
1000 Louisiana St. Suite 5690
Houston TX 77002---
713/236-627-
Mycom Houston Enterprises Inc.
Mr. Hank Noguchi 
4327 Centergate Dr.
San Antonio TX 78217----
210/599-4518
Nagaoka U.S.A. Corp.
Mr. Yoshi Nagaoka
Northwoods Industrial Park Central 119
Houston TX 77401----
713/937-1590
Nippon Pigment inc. 
10900 Strang Road. 
La Porte TX 77571 —  
713/471-4777
Noltex L, L. C. 
12220 Strang Road. 
La Porte TX 77571- 
713/937-5800
Oyo Geospace Instruments, Inc.
Mr. Arnold Pater 
9777 W. Gulfbank 10
Houston TX 77040----
713/937-5800
Phillips Sumika Polypropylene Co. 
2625 Bay Area Alvd. Suite 590
Houston TX 77058----
713/244-3088
Precision Rolls Inc. 
4205 McEwen Road. 
Farmers Branch TX 75244 
214/386-6700
Quartz International Corporation 
Mr. Mark Rowe
1625 Crescent Circle. Suite#112
Carrollton TX 75006----
214/323-0442
Sanden International USA, Inc. 
601 S. Sanden B,vd..
Wylie TX 75098-4999 
214/442-8400
Satake ESM International Inc. 
9800 Townpark Dr.
Houston TX 77036----
713/981-9185
Shinko Wire America. Inc.
Mr. Yoshi Tanaka 
11020 Tanner Rd.
Houston TX 77041----
713/937-7178
Sony Magnetic products. Inc. 
5819 Riverside Dr.
Laredo TX 78041----
713/937-9185
Nisseki Chemical Texas. Inc. 
16856 Royal Crest Drive. 
Houston TX 77058----
Olympus America, Inc 
Mr. Ray Duram 
3131 West Royal Lane
Irving TX 75063----
£14/556-9697
Parana Suppliers Corp. 
11540 Pellicano
El Paso TX 79936----
915/593-0050
Photronics 
Mt. Mike Yomazo
P. 0. Box 655012-MS943 13536 N. Exp.wa
Dallas TX 75243----
214/995-6275
Primo Microphones, Inc.
Mr. Allan Taler (Mfr Mg)
1805 Couch Dr..
McKinney TX 75069----
214/548-9807
Reichhold Chemical. Inc.
Mr. Denis Atchrson 
1503 Haden Rd.
Houston TX 77105----
713/453-5431
Sanden International USA, Inc,,
10710 Sanden Drive..
Dallas TX 75238----
214/349-3030
Shinko Electric America, Inc 
Suite 825 1701 N. Greenville Avenue 
Richardson TX 75081----
Shintech inc.
5618 Highway 332 East
Freeport TX 77541---
409/233-7861
Sony Microelectronics Corp. 
1 Sony Place
San Antonio TX 78245----
210/681-9000
Sun Graphic Technologies. Inc. 
Mr. Morio Hirota 
14801 Trinity Blvd.
Fort Worth TX 76155----
817/355-9600
Swift Adhesives Inc.
4920 Gold Steet.
Dallas TX 75237----
214/946-2940
Teccor Electronics. Inc.
Mr. Lapierre 
1800 Hurd Dr.
Irving TX 75032-4385 
214/580-1515
Texas ISA. inc.
MR./MS. Sami Sato
14825 St. Mary's Lane Suite 250
Houston TX 77079----
713/493-9925
Toshiba International Corp.
Mr.Yohida Toshio
13131 West Little York Road.
Houston TX 77041----
713/466-0277
Tri- Gas Inc,
Mr. Olsen
4545 Fuller Drive Suite 200 
Irving TX 75038—
214/650-1700
United Technologies Furukawa Corp.
Mr. Debe Stanks
6070 Gateway East Suite 316
El Paso TX 79905----
915/779-3704
Vie de France Bakery Yarrazaki,Inc.
Mr. Rutledge
2314 Mrytle Spring Ave.
Dallas TX 75220-2418 
214/556-0226
Western Stress, Inc.
1101 Richmond Av. *800
Houston TX 77075----
713/991-442
Zeon Chemical Texas Inc. 
11235 Choate Road.
Pasadena TX 77507----
713/474-9693
Sunrise Industry America. Inc. 
Mr, Igarashi 
9600 Plaza Circle
El Paso TX 79927----
915/859-1199
TKS (U.S.A.), Inc.
Mr. Steve Hashimato
1201 Commerce Drive
Richardson TX 75081----
214/437-4466
Texas Arai.Inc.
Mr. Atten
8204 Fairbank N. Houston Road.
Houston TX 77064--.—
713/937-1800
The Graphic Technology Corp. 
2113 Wells Branch Pkwy 
Austin TX 
512/990-9700
Toyoda Machinnery USA Inc.
Mr. Michael D. Goodger
Suite 130, 16801 Greenspoint Drive
Houston TX 77060— —
713/875-4450
U. S, Ink
Mr. Reichel
12010 Corporate Drive.
Dallas TX 75228----
214/650-1700
VAM PTS Corrpany 
Mr. Hanmond 
19210 Hardy Road
Houston TX 77073----
713/821-5510
Western SLiyho Tech Plant
US Hwy. 69 North
Jackspnvile TX 75766----
Xetel Corporation 
Mr. /Ms. Angela Decaro 
2525 Brockton Dr.
Austin TX 78758----
512/834-2266
Zexel USA Corp. Texas Division 
MR. Price
1102 W. N. Carrier Pkwy
Grand Prairie TX 75050----
214/641-7000
